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Abstract
This paper develops estimation methods for network formation models using
observed data from a single large network. The model allows for utility exter-
nalities from friends of friends and friends in common, so the expected utility
is nonlinear in the link choices of an agent. We propose a novel method that
uses the Legendre transform to express the expected utility as a linear function
of the individual link choices. This implies that the optimal link decision is
that for an agent who myopically chooses to establish links or not to the other
members of the network. The dependence between the agent’s link choices is
through an auxiliary variable. We propose a two-step estimation procedure
that requires weak assumptions on equilibrium selection, is simple to compute,
and has consistent and asymptotically normal estimators for the parameters.
Monte Carlo results show that the estimation procedure performs well.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the estimation of game-theoretic
models of network formation (Jackson, 2008). The purpose of the empirical anal-
ysis is to recover the preferences of the members of the network, in particular the
preferences that determine whether a member of the network forms links (friendship,
business relation or some other type of link) with other members of the network. The
preference for a link depends in general on the exogenous characteristics of the two
members, and on their endogenous positions in the network, e.g., their number of
links and their number of common links. It is the dependence of the link preference
of an agent on the endogenous position of a potential partner in the network that
complicates the analysis. The link preference of an agent also depends on unobserv-
able features of the link. Assumptions on the nature of these unobservables play a
key role in the empirical analysis.
Link formation models are discrete choice models where the choice is between
alternatives that consist of the links to the other members. In a network with n
members an agent chooses between 2n−1 overlapping sets of links. Because our anal-
ysis assumes that n grows large, this seems an intractable discrete choice problem.
Our main contribution is to propose a method that for a general class of link prefer-
ences transforms this intractable discrete choice problem into a tractable sequence of
related binary choice problems.
The first simplification comes from the assumption that agents have incomplete
information on unobservables when making their link choices. We assume that agents
know the unobserved (by the econometrician) utility shocks for their own potential
links, but not the unobserved utility shocks for the potential links of the other agents.
An alternative assumption is complete information under which agents know not just
the unobserved utility shocks of their own potential links, but also those of the links
for all other agents in the network. The complete information models are the hard-
est to estimate and the utility function parameters are in general partially identified
(de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer, 2018; Miyauchi, 2016; Sheng, 2018). Leung
(2015) considers an incomplete information model where the utility function is ad-
ditively separable in one’s own links. In that case, the optimal strategy is a set of
independent binary link choices so that a link is established if the expected utility
of the link is greater than the expected utility of not forming the link. If the utility
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function depends on one’s own links in a nonseparable way, then the optimal strategy
does not have this simple form. An important example of a non-additively separable
utility function occurs if the utility of a link depends on links in common. If links
in common have a positive utility then the network exhibits clustering which is a
common feature of real-world networks.
We show that even if the utility function depends on the product of link choice
indicators, the expected utility maximizing link choices are still equivalent to a set
of (correlated) binary link choices. To obtain this equivalence we use the Legendre
transform to linearize the expected utility function. This linearization introduces an
auxiliary variable that depends on the unobserved utility shocks of the agent’s links.
This auxiliary variable is itself the solution to a (non-differentiable) optimization
problem. After the inclusion of the auxiliary variable we can represent the optimal
link decision as a set of binary link choices.
The parameters of the utility function can be estimated by a two-step procedure
where in the first-step reduced-form link probabilities are estimated, and in the second
step we estimate the utility function parameters. The asymptotic analysis of the
two-step estimator has some complications. We assume that we have data on a
single large network. A number of papers as Menzel (2017), Leung (2015), and
de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018) consider estimation using such data.
In our model the link choices are dependent for each agent but not across agents. The
dependence can be represented by the auxiliary variable introduced by the Legendre
transform. If the number of network members n grows large the auxiliary variable
converges to a constant that does not depend on the unobserved utility shocks so the
link dependence vanishes. Our two-step estimator based on the observations on links
is consistent even with this finite network dependence. The link dependence has to
be accounted for in the asymptotic variance of the estimator.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
the specific utility function that we will use. We also discuss the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for the network. In Section 3 we obtain a closed-form expression for the
optimal link choices of an agent. Section 4 discusses the two-step estimator. Section
5 introduces a number of extensions of the model and estimator. Section 6 reports
the results of a simulation study.
3
2 Model
Consider n agents who choose to form links (or not) to each other. We introduce our
model for friendships, but it applies to any kind of links or agents. The links form a
network, which is represented by an n× n binary matrix G ∈ G with G the set of all
n×n binary matrices with a 0 main diagonal. The (i, j) element Gij = 1 if i and j are
linked and 0 otherwise. The diagonal elements Gii are set to 0. We consider directed
links, i.e., Gij and Gji may be different. The case of undirected links is discussed
later in Section 5.2.
Each individual i has a vector of observed characteristics Xi ∈ X and a vector
of unobserved utility shocks εi = (εi1, . . . , εi,i−1, εi,i+1, . . . , εin)
′ ∈ Rn−1, where εij is
i’s unobserved utility shock for link ij. We assume that the vector of characteristics
X = (X ′1, . . . , X
′
n)
′ ∈ X n is public information of all individuals, but the utility shock
vector εi is the private information of i. We also assume that the utility shocks are
i.i.d. and are independent of the observables.
Assumption 1 (i) εij, ∀i 6= j, are i.i.d. with cdf Fε (·; θε) known up to the parameter
vector θε ∈ Θε ⊂ Rdε. The distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure and has a density fε (·; θε) that is continuously differentiable in
θε and strictly positive and bounded on R. (ii) The vector of utility shocks ε =
(ε′1, . . . , ε
′
n)
′ and X are independent.
Utility Given the vector of characteristics X and the private utility shocks εi, the
utility of network G for i is
Ui(G,X, εi; θu) =
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
ui (Gj , X ; β) +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
Gikvi (Gj , Gk, X ; γ)− εij
)
,
(2.1)
where Gi = (Gij, j 6= i) denotes the ith row of G, i.e., the links formed by i. We
assume that the utility function is known up to the parameter vector θu = (β
′, γ′)′ in
a compact set Θu ⊂ Rdu .
In (2.1), ui(Gj, X ; β) represents the part of the incremental utility from a link
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with j that does not depend on i’s link decision Gi. An obvious specification is
ui (Gj, X ; β) = β1 +X
′
iβ2 + |Xi −Xj |′ β3 +Gjiβ4 +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
Gjkβ5 (Xi, Xj , Xk) .
(2.2)
The first four terms in (2.2) capture the direct utility from the link with j, which
depends on the homophily effect (β3) and the reciprocity effect (β4). The last term
in (2.2) captures the indirect utility from j’s friends, which may vary with the char-
acteristics of the individuals involved. This specification is similar to that in Leung
(2015).
The utility function in (2.1) also accounts for the utility that i derives from simul-
taneously linking with j and k, denoted by vi (Gj, Gk, X ; γ). An important example
is the utility derived from friends in common
vi (Gj, Gk, X ; γ) = GjkGkjγ1 (Xi, Xj, Xk) +
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
GjlGklγ2 (Xi, Xj , Xk) , (2.3)
where the first term captures the utility of friends in common that are directly con-
nected1 and the second term captures the utility of friends in common that are indi-
rectly connected. Allowing for such potential complementarities of links is crucial if
we want to model networks that exhibit clustering, i.e., two individuals with friends
in common are more likely to be friends (Jackson, 2008). The main difference between
our model and that of Leung (2015) is that we allow for the complementarity of link
decisions.
We normalize the sum terms in (2.1)-(2.3) by n− 2 or n− 3 to ensure that these
terms remain bounded when n increases to infinity, the data scenario we consider in
the asymptotic analysis.
Equilibrium Let Gi (X, εi) denote individual i’s link decision, which is a mapping
from i’s information (X, εi) to a vector of links Gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1. Write G =
(Gi, G−i), where G−i denotes the submatrix of G with the ith row deleted, i.e., the
links formed by individuals other than i.
Each individual i makes her optimal link decision by maximizing her expected
utility E [Ui(gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi] over gi ∈ Gi, where the expectation is taken with
1We can replace GjkGkj by Gjk +Gkj .
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respect to the link decisions of other individuals G−i. Since G−i is a function of X
and ε−i =
(
ε′j, j 6= i
)′
, and the private shocks εi are assumed to be independent across
i (Assumption 1), individual i’s belief about G−i depends on her information (X, εi)
only through the public information X . Let σi (gi|X) = Pr (Gi (X, εi) = gi|X) be
the conditional probability that individual i chooses gi given X . The independence
of ε1, . . . , εn implies that the link decisions Gi are independent across i given X , so
individual i’s belief about the link decisions of others is σ−i (g−i|X) =
∏
j 6=i σj (gj|X).
Let σ (X) = {σi (gi|X) , gi ∈ Gi, i = 1, . . . , n} denote the belief profile. For a given
belief profile σ, the expected utility of individual i is given by
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
E [ui (Gj, X)|X, σ] + 1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
GikE [vi (Gj , Gk, X)|X, σ]− εij
)
.
(2.4)
For the specification in (2.2) and (2.3), we have
E [ui (Gj, X)|X, σ] = β1 +X ′iβ2 + |Xi −Xj|′ β3 + E [Gji|X, σ] β4
+
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
E [Gjk|X, σ] β5 (Xi, Xj, Xk) , (2.5)
and
E [vi (Gj, Gk, X)|X, σ] =E [Gjk|X, σ]E [Gkj|X, σ] γ1 (Xi, Xj, Xk)
+
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
E [Gjl|X, σ]E [Gkl|X, σ] γ2 (Xi, Xj, Xk) ,
(2.6)
with e.g.
E [Gji|X, σ] =
∑
gj∈Gj :gji=1
σj(gj|X).
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Given X and σ, the probability that individual i chooses gi is
Pr (Gi = gi|X, σ)
= Pr
(
E [Ui(gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ] ≥ max
g˜i∈Gi
E [Ui(g˜i, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
∣∣∣∣X, σ
)
.
(2.7)
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ (X) = {σ∗i (gi|X) , gi ∈ Gi.i = 1, . . . , n} is a belief
profile that satisfies
σ∗i (gi|X) = Pr (Gi = gi|X, σ∗ (X)) (2.8)
for all link decisions gi ∈ Gi and all i = 1, . . . , n. There may be multiple belief profiles
that satisfy (2.8).
3 Optimal Link Choices
The major challenge in estimating the model in Section 2 is that the expected utility
of each agent i in (2.4) is nonseparable in her link choices, because the expected
utility depends on GijGik. Solving for the optimal link choices is therefore a nonlinear
integer programming problem that does not have a closed-form solution and has a
problem size that grows with the number of agents. In this section, we develop an
approach that overcomes this challenge and yields an expression for the link choice
probability that is computationally convenient and can be used to derive asymptotic
properties of parameter estimators. The idea is to find an auxiliary variable that
captures the strategic interactions between i’s link choices, so that after inclusion
of this auxiliary variable the link choices become binary correlated choices, with the
correlation between the link choices controlled by the auxiliary variable.
As a first step we observe that the expected utility from friends in common, i.e.,
the term E [vi (Gj , Gk, X)|X, σ] in (2.6), is symmetric in j and k.2 Later on we will
focus on equilibria that are symmetric in individuals’ observed characteristics. We
say that an equilibrium σ (X) is symmetric if for i and j with Xi = Xj , we have
σi (X) = σj (X), where σi (X) = {σi (gi|X) , gi ∈ Gi} denotes the conditional choice
probability profile of individual i.3 In social networks, we typically do not observe
2An implicit assumption is that γ1 (Xi, Xj , Xk) and γ2 (Xi, Xj, Xk) are symmetric in Xj and Xk.
3Note that i and j have the same choice probabilities, but with probability 1 different expected
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the identities of the agents and labels are arbitrary. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that the equilibrium is symmetric because otherwise the conditional choice
probabilities of an individual depend on how we label the observationally identical
individuals. The symmetry of the equilibrium σ implies that agents j and k who have
the same observed characteristics (i.e., Xj = Xk) have the same conditional choice
probabilities, i.e., σj = σk, so E [vi (Gj , Gk, X)|X, σ] depends on j and k only through
the values of Xj and Xk. Therefore E [vi (Gj , Gk, X)|X, σ] is a symmetric function
of Xj and Xk.
To facilitate the presentation, we focus on the case where Xi is discrete. We
assume that Xi takes a finite number of values, which are referred to as the types of
the individuals.4
Assumption 2 (Discrete X) Xi takes T <∞ distinct values x1, . . . , xT .
Under Assumption 2, E [vi (Gj, Gk, X)|X, σ] takes T 2 possible values, depending
on the types of j and k. For any s, t = 1, . . . , T , let Vi,st (X, σ) denote the value of
E [vi (Gj, Gk, X)|X, σ] if j and k are of types s and t, respectively,
Vi,st (X, σ) = E [vi (Gj, Gk, X)|Xj = xs, Xk = xt, X, σ] .
Clearly Vi,st (X, σ) = Vi,ts (X, σ). We arrange the type-specific expected utilities of
friends in common in a T × T symmetric matrix
Vi (X, σ) =


Vi,11 (X, σ) · · · Vi,1T (X, σ)
...
...
Vi,T1 (X, σ) · · · Vi,TT (X, σ)

 . (3.1)
The expected utility in (2.4) can thus be represented as
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi; θu)|X, εi, σ]
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij (X, σ)− εij) + 1
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
GijGikZ
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk, (3.2)
utilities due to different random utility shocks.
4Potentially we can relax the assumption and allow for continuous X , but this will complicate
the derivation of the optimal link choices because we need to replace the matrix notation with linear
operators. For simplicity, we focus on discrete X in the paper and leave continuous X to future
research.
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where Zj is a T × 1 vector of binary variables that indicates the type of individual j
Zj = (1 {Xj = x1} , . . . , 1 {Xj = xT })′
and
Uij (X, σ) = E [ui (Gj, X)|X, σ]− 1
n− 2Z
′
jVi (X, σ)Zj. (3.3)
The term Z ′jVi (X, σ)Zk represents the additional expected utility that individual i
receives if she links to both j and k and this additional utility depends on j and k’s
types.
We transform the expected utility in two steps, so that after the transformation
the optimal decision can be obtained in closed form. First, since the matrix Vi (X, σ)
is real and symmetric, it has a real spectral decomposition
Vi (X, σ) = Φi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ) Φi (X, σ)
′ , (3.4)
where Λi (X, σ) = diag (λi1 (X, σ) , . . . , λiT (X, σ)) is the T × T diagonal matrix of
eigenvalues λit (X, σ) ∈ R, t = 1, . . . , T , and Φi (X, σ) = (φi1 (X, σ) , . . . , φiT (X, σ))
is the T × T orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors φit (X, σ) ∈ RT , t = 1, . . . , T . Using
the spectral decomposition we can express the second term in the expected utility in
(3.2) in a form that involves only the square of functions that are linear in the link
choices, i.e., 1
n−1
∑
j 6=iGijZ
′
jφit (X, σ), t = 1, . . . , T .
In the second step we ”linearize” these squares of linear functions using the Leg-
endre transform (Rockafellar, 1970). In particular, for any Y , we have the identity
Y 2 = max
ω∈R
{
2Y ω − ω2} (3.5)
By choosing Y as the linear function 1
n−1
∑
j 6=iGijZ
′
jφit (X, σ), we can replace the
square of this function by the maximization in (3.5). This maximization has an
objective function that is linear in Y and therefore also linear in the link choices
Gij. The linearity will allow us to derive the optimal decision in closed form. The
transformation of the expected utility is presented in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied. The expected utility in
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(3.2) is equal to
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij (X, σ)− εij) + (n− 1)
2
n− 2
T∑
t=1
λit (X, σ)
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
jφit (X, σ)
)2
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij (X, σ)− εij)
+
(n− 1)2
n− 2
T∑
t=1
λit (X, σ)max
ωt∈R
{
2
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
jφit (X, σ)
)
ωt − ω2t
}
(3.6)
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
To derive the optimal decision, recall that it is the link vector Gi that maximizes
the expected utility. For the expected utility in (3.6), if the eigenvalues λit (X, σ),
t = 1, . . . , T , are nonnegative (Assumption 3), we can interchange the maximization
over ω = (ω1, . . . , ωT )
′ and the maximization over Gi. Therefore, the optimal Gi is
the solution to a simple maximization with an objective function that is linear in Gi.
If we evaluate the optimal Gi at the optimal ω, we obtain the optimal link decision
that maximizes the expected utility.
The solution is particularly simple if we assume the following.
Assumption 3 Given X, for all θu ∈ Θu, all equilibria σ, and i = 1, . . . , n, the
smallest eigenvalue of the matrix Vi (X, σ) is nonnegative.
In Section 5.1 we show that the closed-form solution, with some modifications,
remains valid if some or all of the eigenvalues are negative. Assumption 3 holds if
link preferences have a large degree of homophily. If we define the type-specific link
probability
pst (X, σ) = Pr (Gjk = 1|Xj = xs, Xk = xt, X, σ)
and assume in (2.3) that γ1 (Xi, Xj , Xk) ≡ γ1 > 0, i.e., friends in common have
positive utility, and γ2 (Xi, Xj, Xk) ≡ 0, then
Vi (X, σ) = γ1


p211 (X, σ) · · · p1T (X, σ) pT1 (X, σ)
...
...
p1T (X, σ) pT1 (X, σ) · · · p2T1 (X, σ)

 . (3.7)
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A sufficient condition for the eigenvalues to be nonnegative is that the matrix is
diagonally dominant, i.e., for all types t
p2tt (X, σ) ≥
∑
s 6=t
pst (X, σ) pts (X, σ) .
Our key result on the optimal link choices is as follows.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. For each i, the optimal
decision Gi (εi, X, σ) = (Gij (εi, X, σ) , j 6= i)′ ∈ {0, 1}n−1 is given by
Gij (εi, X, σ) = 1
{
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (εi, X, σ)− εij ≥ 0
}
,
(3.8)
for all j 6= i, where the T × 1 vector ωi (εi, X, σ) = (ωi1 (εi, X, σ) , . . . , ωiT (εi, X, σ))′
is a solution to the maximization problem
max
ω
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ)
=max
ω
∑
j 6=i
[
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λi (X, σ)ω
(3.9)
with [·]+ = max {·, 0}. Set ωit (εi, X, σ) = 0 if λit (X, σ) = 0. Moreover, both
Gi (εi, X, σ) and ωi (εi, X, σ) are unique almost surely.
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
To understand the role and interpretation of ωi (εi, X, σ) we consider the first-order
condition of (3.9) derived in the Supplemental Appendix
Λi (X, σ)ωi (εi, X, σ) =
1
n− 1Λi (X, σ) Φ
′
i (X, σ)
∑
k 6=i
Gik (εi, X, σ)Zk.
If we multiply both sides of this equation by 2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ), we find
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (εi, X, σ) =
2
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
Gik (εi, X, σ)Z
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk.
(3.10)
11
Note that the left-hand side is the component of the choice index in (3.8) associated
with friends in common. The right-hand side is the expected marginal utility (times
2) from friends in common. To see this, note that if i contemplates a link with j,
then i considers that her friends k can become friends in common with j. If j is of
type s and i’s friend k, a potential friend in common, is of type t, then the expected
utility of i from the friend in common with j is Vi,st(X, σ). Taking the sum over all
friends k of i, we obtain the expected utility of friends in common if i links to j.
Corollary 3.3 suggests that the optimal decision Gi (εi, X, σ) resembles the pure-
stategy Nash equilibrium in an entry game (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Tamer, 2003)
where the entry decisions are the link choices.
Corollary 3.3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. For each i, the optimal
decision Gi (εi, X, σ) satisfies
Gij (εi, X, σ) = 1
{
Uij (X, σ) +
2
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
Gik (εi, X, σ)Z
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk ≥ εij
}
,
(3.11)
for all j 6= i, and
∑
j 6=i
Gij (εi, X, σ)
(
Uij (X, σ) +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
Gik (εi, X, σ)Z
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk − εij
)
≥ max
g˜i satisfies (3.11) a.s.
∑
j 6=i
g˜ij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
g˜ikZ
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk − εij
)
(3.12)
with probability 1, where g˜i ∈ {0, 1}n−1. Moreover, for each gi, if we substitute
Gi (εi, X, σ) = gi in (3.11) and (3.12) and define the set
E (gi, X, σ) =
{
εi ∈ Rn−1 : gi satisfies both (3.11) and (3.12)
}
. (3.13)
Then E (gi, X, σ), gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1, is a partition of Rn−1 with probability 1.
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
From the corollary, the optimal decision Gi (εi, X, σ) is a solution to the simul-
tanous discrete choice model in (3.11), where an optimal link choice is determined
by a random utility binary choice model and the latent utility includes the expected
utility of friends in common as in (3.10). This makes the model in (3.11) and the
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model for an entry game (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Tamer, 2003) similar if the po-
tential entrants are the n − 1 agents that i can link to. In this model the strategic
interactions occur because the link utility depends on friends in common.
The system in (3.11) can have multiple solutions. Because i chooses links that
maximize her expected utility, we have a natural equilibrium selection mechanism.
That is, among the solutions to system (3.11), i chooses the Gi (εi, X, σ) that gives
the highest expected utility as stated in (3.12). The set E (gi, X, σ) defined in (3.13) is
the collection of εi ∈ Rn−1 such that gi is the optimal solution, i.e., Gi (εi, X, σ) = gi.
By Theorem 3.2 there is a unique optimal Gi (εi, X, σ) that satisfies both (3.11) and
(3.12) with probability 1. Therefore, the sets E (gi, X, σ), gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1, form a
partition of the support of εi. These results are useful for establishing the properties
of the conditional choice probabilities in Section 4.
The auxiliary variable ωi (εi, X, σ) provides an explicit expression for the depen-
dence of the link choices of an agent. Note that ωi (εi, X, σ) is an optimal solution to
the problem in (3.9), with an objective function that depends on εi, so the maximizer
ωi (εi, X, σ) is a function of εi. Under Assumption 1, two optimal link choices Gij
and Gik are dependent because (i) they both depend on ωi (εi, X, σ), as shown in
(3.8), and (ii) ωi (εi, X, σ) in Gij is correlated with the utility shock εik for Gik, and
symmetrically ωi (εi, X, σ) in Gik is correlated with the utility shock εij for Gij. This
explicit characterization of the link dependence allows us to examine the dependence
if n is large, a crucial step in the asymptotic analysis in Section 4.
If the matrix Vi (X, σ) is singular, the ωit (εi, X, σ) that correspond to the zero
eigenvalues λit (X, σ) = 0 are indeterminate. Since it is Λi (X, σ)ωi (εi, X, σ) that
enters (3.8), the indeterminate ωit (εi, X, σ) are irrelevant for the optimal decision.
For that reason we can arbitrarily set ωit (εi, X, σ) = 0 if λit (X, σi, σ) = 0.
In the special case that friends in common have no effect, i.e., γ1, γ2 ≡ 0, the
matrix Vi (X, σ) ≡ 0, so all the eigenvalues are equal to 0. In this case, the optimal
link choice in (3.8) reduces to
Gij = 1 {E [ui (Gj , X)|X, σ]− εij ≥ 0} , ∀j 6= i
This is the optimal link choice problem for a utility specification that is seperable in
i’s own links (Leung, 2015).
We focus on symmetric equilibria as discussed earlier. Applying Corollary 3.3, we
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can show that there exists a symmetric equilibrium. There may be multiple symmetric
equilibria that satisfy (2.8). We assume that the observed equilibrium is symmetric.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. For any X, there exists
a symmetric equilibrium σ (X).
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
4 Estimation
In this section, we discuss how to estimate the structural parameter θ ∈ Rdθ . We
propose a two-step procedure, where we estimate the conditional link probabilities
nonparametrically in the first step, and estimate the parameter θ in the second step.
When we analyze the properties of this estimator, a few complications arise. First,
the model can have multiple equilibria. Second, the data are links in a single large
network, where the links formed by an individual are dependent due to the preference
for friends in common. We will discuss how these complications affect the estimation,
and how we overcome them when we derive the properties of the estimator of θ.
Let us start with the data generating process. In this paper, we consider the
scenario where we observe links from a single network, and in the asymptotic analysis
we assume that the number of nodes of the network n increases to infinity.5 To
highlight the dependence of the network G on n we denote the network as Gn.
We think of the data as being generated by the following process. First, we draw
a vector X = (X ′1, . . .X
′
n)
′ from a joint discrete distribution where Xi represents the
observed characteristics of individual i. The characteristics need not be independent
across individuals. Because X is ancillary, we treat X as fixed. Second, for each i we
draw an n − 1 vector of unobserved link preferences εi that are independent across
individuals. Third, individuals form links that maximize their expected utility that
depends on the equilibrium σn. There can be multiple equilibria, and nature selects
one equilibrium σn among the fixed points in (2.8). We can think of σn as having a
distribution over all the equilibria, i.e., the fixed points of (2.8). We condition on σn
in addition to X to indicate that a particular equilibrium is selected.
5If we observe more than one network, we estimate the link probabilities in each network sepa-
rately in the first step. In the second step we pool the links from the networks to estimate θ.
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The expected utility in (2.4) and the optimal link choice in (3.8) depend on the
equilibrium σn only through the link probabilities of each pair, so we can replace σn
by the vector of link probabilities pn = (pn,ij, i, j = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j). The optimal link
choice Gn,ij (εi, X, θ, pn) in (3.8) implies the structural choice probability
Pn,ij (X, θ, pn) = Pr (Gn,ij (εi, X, θ, pn) = 1|X, pn) . (4.1)
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (2.8) is that for all i 6= j
pn,ij = Pn,ij (X, θ, pn) . (4.2)
Because of the symmetric equilibrium and the discrete X , each pn,ij depends on
i and j only through their types. Therefore the link choice only depends on pn,st,
s, t = 1, . . . T , the link probabilities between types. With abuse of notation we let
pn = (pn,st, s, t = 1, . . . , T ).
The equilibrium condition in (4.2) suggests an estimator of θ with the following
two steps. In the first step, we estimate each pn,st by the relative frequency of links
between pairs of types s and t
pˆn,st =
∑
i
∑
j 6=iGn,ij1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
, s, t = 1, . . . , T. (4.3)
In the second step, we estimate θ based on the moment condition (from now on we
omit X in Pn,ij (X, θ, pn))
Ψˆn (θ, pn) =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ, pn)) , (4.4)
where Wˆn,ij ∈ Rdθ , i, j = 1, . . . , n, is a dθ × 1 vector of instruments that may depend
on X and pn. The estimator θˆn is a solution to the equation
Ψˆn
(
θˆn, pˆn
)
= 0. (4.5)
The population moment function is
Ψn (θ, pn) =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (E [Gn,ij|X, pn]− Pn,ij (θ, pn)) , (4.6)
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whereWn,ij ∈ Rdθ , i, j = 1, . . . , n, is a dθ×1 vector of population instruments that are
the probability limits of the components of Wˆn,ij. Let θ0 denote the true value of θ.
Because E [Gn,ij|X, pn] = Pn,ij (θ0, pn), θ0 satisfies the population moment condition
Ψn (θ0, pn) = 0.
Our model can have multiple equilibria. Nevertheless, we do not need to specify an
equilibrium selection mechanism, which in our model is the selection of a particular pn.
This is because in our two-step estimation procedure we estimate pn in the first step
and substitute the estimate in the moment condition to estimate the utility function
parameters. Because we consider a single network instead of multiple networks, we
do not need an assumption on equilibrium selection across networks either.6
Under the additional Assumption 4, θˆn is a consistent estimator of θ0.
Assumption 4 (i) The parameter θ lies in a compact set Θ ⊆ Rdθ . (ii) For an
equilibrium pn and for all n, the system of equations Ψn (θ, pn) = 0 has a unique
solution θ0. (iii) The instruments Wˆn,ij and their population counterpartsWn,ij, i, j =
1, . . . , n, satisfy maxi,j=1,...,n
∥∥∥Wˆn,ij −Wn,ij∥∥∥ p→ 0 and maxi,j=1,...,n ‖Wn,ij‖ < ∞. (iv)
For s, t = 1, . . . , T , limn→∞ 1n(n−1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt} exists and is strictly
positive.
Assumption 4(iv) imposes a mild restriction that the fraction of pairs of all types
s and t is positive as n→∞, so that the number of pairs of all types grows without
bounds, and we can estimate the link probabilities pn,st consistently. This assumption
is satisfied if Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, are i.i.d. or have limited dependence.
Assumption 4(ii) is a local identification condition, local because it is an identifi-
cation condition for θ for a given equilibrium pn.
7 It requires that the solution θ0 is
invariant to the equilibrium pn selected for all n.
Theorem 4.1 (Consistency) If Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied, then
θˆn − θ0 p→ 0.
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
6We need to assume that the equilibrium selection does not depend on the random utility shocks
ε.
7Because of multiple equilibria we do not assume the global identification condition that
Ψn (θ, p) = 0 has a unique solution (θ0, pn).
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We first show that pˆn is consistent for pn and next establish the consistency of
θˆn. In addition to the identification condition, we need a uniform LLN for the sample
moment Ψˆn (θ, pn). Note that links formed by different individuals in a single network
are independent given X and pn. This is crucial for a LLN to hold. Moreover, because
link choices depend on the number of agents in the network, the distribution of the
data on the links in a network with n nodes depends on n. Therefore, we prove the
uniform LLN for a triangular array (Pollard, 1990).
Next we examine the asymptotic distribution of θˆn. The complication is that the
links formed by an individual are correlated. By Theorem 3.2, the link choices Gn,ij
and Gn,ik of individual i are correlated because they both depend on the auxiliary
variable ωni (εi, θ0, pn) that maximizes the objective function
Πni (ω, εi, θ0, pn) =
∑
j 6=i
[
Un,ij (θ0, pn) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦni (θ0, pn) Λni (θ0, pn)ω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λni (θ0, pn)ω, (4.7)
where we add subscript n to Πi, Uij , Λi, and Φi to indicate their dependence on n.
To derive the asymptotic distribution of θˆn, we first derive the asymptotic proper-
ties of ωni (εi, θ0, pn), and then investigate how ωni (εi, θ0, pn) affects the asymptotic
distribution of θˆn.
In particular, let Π∗ni (ω, θ0, pn) be the conditional expectation of Πni (ω, εi, θ0, pn)
given X and pn
Π∗ni (ω, θ0, pn)
=
∑
j 6=i
E
[[
Un,ij (θ0, pn) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦni (θ0, pn) Λni (θ0, pn)ω − εij
]
+
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λni (θ0, pn)ω. (4.8)
We make the following assumptions on the auxiliary variable.
Assumption 5 (i) The auxiliary variable ω is in a compact set Ω ⊆ RT , which
contains a compact neighborhood of 0. (ii) The function Π∗ni (ω, θ0, pn) has a unique
maximizer ω∗ni (θ0, pn). (iii) The gradient Γ
∗
ni (ω, θ0, pn) of Π
∗
ni (ω, θ0, pn) has the Ja-
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cobian matrix8
∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω, θ0, pn)
=
(
2
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZjZ
′
jΦni − IT
)
Λni
with IT being the T × T identity matrix, where the T × T matrix in parentheses
2
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZjZ
′
jΦni − IT
is nonsingular at ω∗ni (θ0, pn).
Under Assumption 5, we show in the Supplemental Appendix that ωni (εi, θ0, pn)
is consistent for ω∗ni (θ0, pn) and has an asymptotically linear representation
ωni (εi, θ0, pn)− ω∗ni (θ0, pn) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni (θ0, pn) , εij, θ0, pn) + op
(
1√
n
)
.
(4.9)
In this representation ϕωn,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) ∈ RT is the influence function
ϕωn,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) = ∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω, θ0, pn)+ ϕpin,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn)
where ϕpin,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) ∈ RT is defined by
ϕpin,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj − Λniω.
Since ω∗i (θ0, pn) is deterministic, the convergence of ωni (εi, θ0, pn) to ω
∗
ni (θ0, pn)
indicates that the correlation between links Gn,ij and Gn,ik vanishes as n approaches
infinity. Moreover, the asymptotically linear representation in (4.9) implies that
ωni (εi, θ0, pn) converges to ω
∗
ni (θ0, pn) at the rate of n
−1/2. This rate is crucial in
deriving the asymptotic distribution of the estimator.
Under the additional conditions in Assumption 6, we derive the asymptotic dis-
tribution of θˆn in Theorem 4.2.
8We suppress the dependence of Un,ij , Λni, and Φni on θ0 and pn hereafter.
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Assumption 6 (i) For any i, j = 1, . . . , n, Pn,ij(θ, p) is continuously differentiable
with respect to θ and p in a neighborhood of (θ0, pn). (ii) The dθ×dθ Jacobian matrix
with respect to θ
Jθn (θ0, pn) =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇θ′Pn,ij (θ0, pn)
is nonsingular.
In the Supplemental Appendix (see Lemma S.4) we show that Pn,ij (θ, p) is con-
tinuous in θ (and p). Continuity follows from Corollary 3.3 that shows that there is
a 1-1 relationship between the optimal link decision gi and set E(gi) that partition
Rn−1. The boundaries of the partition sets are continuous, but can have kinks if the
set of inequalities in (3.12) that are binding depends on θ. We assume that there
is a possibly small neighborhood of θ0 without kinks, so that the choice probability
is continuously differentiable in that neighborhood. Because we already established
consistency, the estimator is in that neighborhood with probability approaching 1.
Theorem 4.2 (Asymptotic Distribution) Suppose that Assumptions 1-6 are sat-
isfied. Define the dθ × dθ matrix
Σn (θ0, pn)
=
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Jθn (θ0, pn)
−1
E
[
ϕmn,ij (εij, θ0, pn)ϕ
m
n,ij (εij, θ0, pn)
′∣∣X, pn] (Jθn (θ0, pn)−1)′
(4.10)
with ϕmn,ij (εij, θ0, pn) ∈ Rdθ given by
ϕmn,ij (εij , θ0, pn) =W˜n,ij (θ0, pn)
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni (θ0, pn) , εij, θ0, pn)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni (θ0, pn) , θ0, pn)
)
+ J˜ωni (ω
∗
ni (θ0, pn) , θ0, pn)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni (θ0, pn) , εij, θ0, pn) (4.11)
for all i 6= j, where ω∗ni (θ0, pn) is the maximizer of Π∗ni (ω, θ0, pn). In this expression
W˜n,ij (θ0, pn) ∈ Rdθ is a dθ × 1 vector of augmented instruments that include the
contribution of the first-step estimates
W˜n,ij (θ0, pn) =Wn,ij −
(
1
n (n− 1)
∑
k
∑
l 6=k
Wn,kl∇p′Pn,kl (θ0, pn)
)
Qn,ij (4.12)
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with Qn,ij = [Qn,ij,11, . . . , Qn,ij,1T , . . . , Qn,ij,T1, . . . , Qn,ij,TT ]
′ ∈ RT 2 and
Qn,ij,st =
1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
1
n(n−1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
, s, t = 1, . . . , T.
Further gn,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) is the link choice indicator for a given ω
gn,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω ≥ εij
}
,
and P ∗n,ij (ω, θ0, pn) is the probability of a link given ω
P ∗n,ij (ω, θ0, pn) = Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
.
Also J˜ωni (ω, θ0, pn) is the dθ × T Jacobian matrix of the moment function with link
probabilities P ∗n,ij (ω, θ0, pn) with respect to ω
J˜ωni (ω, θ0, pn) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
W˜n,ij (θ0, pn)∇ω′P ∗n,ij (ω, θ0, pn) ,
and finally ϕωn,ij (ω, εij, θ0, pn) ∈ RT is the influence function given in (4.9). Then
√
n (n− 1)Σ−1/2n (θ0, pn)
(
θˆn − θ0
)
d→ N (0, Idθ)
as n→∞, where Idθ is the dθ × dθ identity matrix.
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
The influence function ϕmn,ij has two components where the first captures the vari-
ability in the link choices. Note that ϕmn,ij, i, j = 1, . . . , n, is independent over j. The
dependence between the link choices is through the auxiliary variable ωni (εi, θ0, pn)
and this contributes to the second component of ϕmn,ij.
In applications, we need to choose the instrument Wˆn,ij. One option is to use the
instrument from the quasi maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE). Let Ln (θ, pˆn) be
the single-link log likelihood function evaluated at the first-step estimate pˆn
Ln (θ, pˆn) =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Gn,ij lnPn,ij (θ, pˆn) + (1−Gn,ij) ln (1− Pn,ij (θ, pˆn)) . (4.13)
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This is not the full-information likelihood, which requires a specification of the equi-
librium selection mechanism. Because link choices are correlated there is also infor-
mation on θ in the joint distribution of pairs of the link choices Gn,ij and Gn,ik (see
also Section 5.2) that is not captured in Ln (θ, pˆn).
Taking the derivative with respect to θ we obtain the quasi-likelihood equation
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∇θPn,ij (θ, pˆn)
Pn,ij (θ, pˆn) (1− Pn,ij (θ, pˆn)) (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ, pˆn)) = 0.
Comparing this with the moment in (4.4) the instrument is
Wˆn,ij (θ) =
∇θPn,ij (θ, pˆn)
Pn,ij (θ, pˆn) (1− Pn,ij (θ, pˆn)) , i, j = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j. (4.14)
This instrument depends on θ. Therefore, we need a preliminary estimator of θ. For
that purpose we can use powers and interactions ofXi and Xj as the dθ instruments in
the moment condition. A preliminary instrument is not needed if we use continuous
updating as in Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996).
In the discussion of Assumption 6(i) we noted that Pn,ij (θ, p) is not differentiable
for a finite number of values of θ. That may be a problem for the instrument, because
it has to be evaluated outside a small neighborhood of θ0 during the search for the
solution of the moment equation. We can avoid this problem, if we use the limiting
choice probability derived in Section 5.3 in the instrument instead of the finite n
probability. The limiting choice probability is differentiable in θ everywhere. We will
come back to this after we discuss the limiting game.
The link choice probability Pn,ij (θ, p) is an n − 1 dimensional integral without a
closed form. It can be computed by simulation. We draw εi independently R times
(and use these simulated utility shocks throughout the search for a solution of the
moment equation), and for each simulated εi,r, r = 1, . . . , R, we compute the auxiliary
variable ωni (εi,r, θ, pˆn) and the vector of link choices Gni (εi,r, θ, pˆn) in (3.8). The
vector of simulated link choice probabilities is the sample average of Gn,ij (εi,r, θ, pˆn),
r = 1, . . . , R. This simulation procedure does not affect the consistency, rate of
convergence, and asymptotic normality of the estimator. The simulated GMM has
an asymptotic variance equal to that in Theorem 4.2 multiplied by 1 + R−1 (Pakes
and Pollard (1989)).
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5 Extensions
5.1 General Vi
Assumption 3 that the matrix Vi (X, σ) is positive semi-definite is not crucial to our
approach. Without this assumption, the auxiliary variable is solved from a maximin
problem.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied. The optimal link decision
Gi (εi, X, σ) = (Gij (εi, X, σ) , j 6= i)′ is given by
Gij (εi, X, σ) = 1
{
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (εi, X, σ)− εij ≥ 0
}
,
(5.1)
almost surely, ∀j 6= i, where the T ×1 vector ωi (εi, X, σ) is a solution to the maximin
problem
max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ)
= max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
∑
j 6=i
[
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λi (X, σ)ω (5.2)
with Ti+ = {t : λit (X, σ) > 0} and Ti− = {t : λit (X, σ) < 0}. We set ωit (εi, X, σ) = 0
if λit (εi, X, σ) = 0. Moreover, both Gi (εi, X, σ) and ωi (εi, X, σ) are unique almost
surely.
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
Note that the expected utility in (3.6) is separable in the maximizations over ωt,
t = 1, . . . , T , so that a maximization over ωt becomes a minimization if λit (X, σ) <
0. If λit (X, σ) = 0, the objective function does not depend on ωt and we set
ωit (εi, X, σ) = 0. The separability also implies that, unlike in a general maximin
or minimax problem, the order of the maximizations and minimizations does not
matter.
To gain some intuition regarding the role of the eigenvalues of Vi (X, σ) we consider
the case with 2 types (T = 2) and a utility specification as in (2.1)-(2.3) with γ1 a
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positive constant and γ2 = 0. We omit the arguments X and σ. The matrix Vi is as
in (3.7) and has nonnegative components. Suppose Vi,12 > 0.
Let λi1 and λi2 be the eigenvalues of Vi with λi1 ≥ λi2. We can see that λi1 >
0.9 Assume that λi2 6= 0, i.e., Vi,11Vi,22 6= V 2i,12. Let φi1 = (φi,11, φi,12)′ and φi2 =
(φi,21, φi,22)
′ be the corresponding eigenvectors. It can be shown that the elements of
φi1 have the same sign, and the elements of φi2 have opposite signs, i.e., φi,11φi,12 > 0
and φi,21φi,22 < 0.
10 Without loss of generality we take φi,11, φi,12 > 0, and φi,21 > 0,
φi,22 < 0.
From the first-order condition of the problem in (5.2), ωi satisfies
ωit = φ
′
it
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
GijZj, a.s., t = 1, 2. (5.3)
Note that
∑
j 6=iGijZj is the 2 × 1 vector of the number of friends that i has of each
type. Therefore, ωit is a weighted sum of the numbers of friends of each type, with
weights equal to the components of the eigenvector φit. By Vi = ΦiΛiΦ
′
i and the
first-order condition in (5.3), the expected utility in (3.2) evaluated at the optimal ωi
can be expressed as
E [Ui|X, εi, σ] =
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij − εij)
+
(n− 1)2
n− 2
(
Φ′i
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
GijZj
)′
Λi
(
Φ′i
1
n− 1
∑
k 6=i
GikZk
)
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij − εij) + (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′
iΛiωi, a.s.
Because λi1 > 0, individual i prefers a larger ωi1, which is a preference for many
friends, with friends of the type that corresponds to the larger of φi,11 and φi,12 being
preferred. If λi2 > 0, i prefers a larger ωi2 (in absolute value), i.e., she prefers her
circle of friends to be of one type. If λi2 < 0, i prefers an ωi2 closer to 0, which is a
preference for an integrated circle of friends.
9The eigenvalues are given by λi1, λi2 =
1
2
(
Vi,11 + Vi,22 ±
√
V 2i,11 + V
2
i,22 + 4V
2
i,12 − 2Vi,11Vi,22
)
.
Since Vi,12 > 0, they satisfy λi1 > max {Vi,11, Vi,22} ≥ 0 and λi2 < min {Vi,11, Vi,22}.
10By definition Viφi1 = λi1φi1, so (λi1 − Vi,11)φi,11 = Vi,12φi,12 and Vi,12φi,11 = (λi1 − Vi,22)φi,12.
Since λi1 > max {Vi,11, Vi,22} and Vi,12 > 0, these equations imply that φi,11 and φi,12 must have
the same sign, i.e., φi,11φi,12 > 0. Similarly, we can show φi,21φi,22 < 0.
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In the special case that Vi,11 = Vi,22 = 0, i.e., only agents of the opposite type
link, the two eigenvalues are λi1 = Vi,12 and λi2 = −Vi,12, and the corresponding
eigenvectors are φi1 =
(
1√
2
, 1√
2
)′
and φi2 =
(
1√
2
,− 1√
2
)′
. In this case,
ωi1 =
1√
2 (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Zj1 + Zj2)
ωi2 =
1√
2 (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Zj1 − Zj2) .
Intuitively, if a network only allows for cross-type links, an agent has the most friends
in common if she makes as many friends as she can (i.e., prefers ωi1 to be large) and
chooses an equal number of friends of each type (i.e., prefers ωi2 to be close to 0).
5.2 Undirected Networks
In this section we show that our method that was derived for directed networks also
can be applied to undirected networks. Let Gij now denote an undirected link between
i and j and G the adjacency matrix of the undirected network. In an undirected
network Gij = Gji. To model the formation of undirected links, we follow the link-
announcement framework (Jackson, 2008) and require mutual consent to form a link.
Specifically, let Sij indicate whether i proposes to link to j. A link is formed if both i
and j propose to form it, so Gij = SijSji. Our approach in Section 3 can be extended
to undirected networks if we work with the proposals instead of the links. Because
we observe the links but not the proposals, the estimation of the parameters is less
straightforward. In this section we show that the extension is possible, but we leave
the development of the extension to future research.
We consider the utility specification in (2.1), with Gij an undirected link. In (2.2)
we omit the reciprocity effect and in (2.3) k is a mutual friend of i and j if j and k
have an undirected link, so that
ui (Gj, X ; β) = β1 +X
′
iβ2 + |Xi −Xj|′ β3 +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
Gjkβ4 (Xi, Xj, Xk)
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and
vi (Gj, Gk, X ; γ) = Gjkγ1 (Xi, Xj, Xk) +
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
GjlGklγ2 (Xi, Xj, Xk) .
Since Gij = SijSji, if S is the n × n matrix of proposed links, then G is a function
of S, and we have G = G (S) = G (Si, S−i), with Si the vector of link proposals
of i and S−i the matrix of link proposals of the other agents. We maintain the
assumption that εi is private information of agent i, so each agent i forms a belief
about the proposals of the other agents, S−i, when choosing Si. GivenX , let σi (si|X)
be the conditional probability that agent i proposes si given X and let σ (X) ={
σi (si|X) , si ∈ {0, 1}n−1 , i = 1, . . . , n
}
be the belief profile. For a belief profile σ,
the expected utility of agent i is given by
E [Ui(G (Si, S−i) , X, εi)|X, εi, σ] =
∑
j 6=i
Sij
(
E [Sjiui (Gj , X)|X, σ]− E [Sji|X, σ] εij
+
1
(n− 2)
∑
k 6=i,j
SikE [SjiSkivi (Gj , Gk, X)|X, σ]
)
,
(5.4)
where
E [Sjiui (Gj , X)|X, σ] =E [Sji|X, σ]
(
β1 +X
′
iβ2 + |Xi −Xj|′ β3
)
+
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
E [SjiSjk|X, σ]E [Skj|X, σ] β4 (Xi, Xj, Xk)
and
E [SjiSkivi (Gj, Gk, X)|X, σ]
=E [SjiSjk|X, σ]E [SkiSkj|X, σ] γ1 (Xi, Xj, Xk)
+
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
E [SjiSjl|X, σ]E [SkiSkl|X, σ]E [SljSlk|X, σ] γ2 (Xi, Xj, Xk) .
In the derivation we have used that Gij = SijSji and Si and Sj are independent given
X and σ. Note that the expected utility depends on the probability that an agent
proposes a link to two other agents simultaneously, as in E [SjiSjk|X, σ], with Sji and
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Sjk dependent.
Just as in Sections 3 and 5.1, we linearize the quadratic part of the expected
utility in (5.4) using the Legendre transform. The linearized (in Si) expected utility
gives the optimal link proposals in closed form. We maintain Assumption 2, so that
X takes T values. For s, t = 1, . . . , T , we define V ui,st (X, σ) as
V ui,st (X, σ) = E [SjiSkivi (Gj, Gk, X)|Xj = xs, Xk = xt, X, σ] .
V ui,st (X, σ) is the expected utility of friends in common if i proposes to link to both j
(of type s) and k (of type t). The superscript u indicates an undirected network. Note
that because the expected value is symmetric in j and k, V ui,st (X, σ) is symmetric in s
and t. Let V ui (X, σ) denote the symmetric T×T matrix with components V ui,st (X, σ),
s, t = 1, . . . , T . Let λuit (X, σ), t = 1, . . . , T , be the eigenvalues of the matrix V
u
i (X, σ)
and φuit (X, σ), t = 1, . . . , T , the corresponding eigenvectors. Further, Λ
u
i (X, σ) =
diag(λui1 (X, σ) , . . . , λ
u
iT (X, σ)) and Φ
u
i (X, σ) the matrix of eigenvectors.
The optimal proposal decision can be represented as a set of related binary choices.
Corollary 5.2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied. The optimal proposal
decision Si (εi, X, σ) = (Sij (εi, X, σ) , j 6= i)′ is given by
Sij (εi, X, σ) = 1
{
Uuij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦ
u
i (X, σ) Λ
u
i (X, σ)ω
u
i (εi, X, σ)− σjiεij ≥ 0
}
,
(5.5)
almost surely, for all j 6= i, where the T×1 vector ωui (εi, X, σ) = (ωuit (εi, X, σ) , t = 1, . . . , T )′
is a solution to the maximin problem
max
(ωt)t∈Ti+
min
(ωt)t∈Ti−
Πui (ω; εi, X, σ)
= max
(ωt)t∈Ti+
min
(ωt)t∈Ti−
∑
j 6=i
[
Uuij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦ
u
i (X, σ) Λ
u
i (X, σ)ω − σjiεij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λui (X, σ)ω
with
Uuij (X, σ) = E [Sjiui (Gj, X)|X, σ]−
1
n− 2Z
′
jV
u
i (X, σ)Zj ,
σji = E [Sji|X, σ], Ti+ = {t : λuit (X, σ) > 0}, and Ti− = {t : λuit (X, σ) < 0}. We set
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ωuit (εi, X, σ) = 0 if λ
u
it (X, σ) = 0. Moreover, both Si (εi, X, σ) and ω
u
i (εi, X, σ) are
unique almost surely.
The directed and undirected cases are quite similar. Essentially only Uij and Vi
are replaced by Uuij and V
u
i . The two-step estimation must be adapted because we
observe the links not the proposals. We leave the full development of our estimator
for undirected networks to future research.
5.3 Limiting Game
In this section, we investigate the limit of the network formation game when the
number of agents n grows large. We show that the link formation probability in the
finite-n game converges to a limit as n approaches infinity. The limiting probability is
in some aspects simpler than the finite-n probability. Because the limiting auxiliary
variable does not depend on εi we do not need simulation to compute the link choice
probability. The limiting link choice probability is also everywhere differentiable in
the parameters.
By Theorem 3.2 the probability that i forms a link to j conditional on the char-
acteristic profile X and the equilibrium σ is
Pn,ij (X, σ)
=Pr (Gn,ij (εi, X, σ) = 1|X, σ)
=Pr
(
Un,ij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦni (X, σ) Λni (X, σ)ωni (εi, X, σ)− εij ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣X, σ
)
.
(5.6)
Note that we added a subscript n to Uij and Vi to emphasize the dependence on the
number of agents in the network.
Until now we have avoided an assumption on how the matrix of individual char-
acteristics X is generated by conditioning on X . For the convergence of (5.6) it is
convenient to assume that Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, are i.i.d. and that the utility specification
is such that Un,ij (X, σ) and Vni (X, σ) converge to limits Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) and Vi (Xi, σ)
as n→∞, as formally stated in Assumption 7 and verified below for the utility spec-
ified in Section 2. Under the assumptions, the link formation probability Pn,ij (X, σ)
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converges to
Pij (Xi, Xj, σ)
=Pr
(
Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) + 2Z
′
jΦi (Xi, σ) Λi (Xi, σ)ωi (Xi, σ)− εij ≥ 0
∣∣Xi, Xj, σ) (5.7)
as n→∞, where Λi (Xi, σ) and Φi (Xi, σ) are the eigenvalue and eigenvector matrices
of Vi (Xi, σ), and ωi (Xi, σ) solves
max
ω
Πi (ω,Xi, σ)
=max
ω
E
([
Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) + 2Z
′
jΦi (Xi, σ) Λi (Xi, σ)ω − εij
]
+
∣∣∣Xi, σ)− ω′Λi (Xi, σ)ω.
(5.8)
The expectation in (5.8) is taken with respect to Xj and εij.
Assumption 7 (i) Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, are i.i.d.. (ii) For Un,ij (X, σ) and Vni (X, σ)
defined in (3.3) and (3.1), there exist Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) and Vi (Xi, σ) such that for any
i and any Xi and Xj, maxj 6=i |Un,ij (X, σ)− Uij (Xi, Xj, σ)| = op (1) and Vni (X, σ)−
Vi (Xi, σ) = op (1). (iii) For any Xi and σ, Πi (ω,Xi, σ) defined in (5.8) has a unique
maximizer ωi (Xi, σ).
An implication of Assumption 7(i) is that in the limit of the choice probability
we average over all Xk, k 6= i, j, so that the limiting choice probability only depends
on Xi and Xj.
11 Assumption 7(ii) is an assumption on the utility function that we
verify below. Assumption 7(iii) ensures that ωi(Xi, σ) is well-defined.
Theorem 5.3 Under Assumptions 1-3 and 7, we have that for all Xi and Xj and all
σ
Pn,ij (X, σ)− Pij (Xi, Xj, σ) = op (1) (5.9)
as n→∞.
Proof. See the Supplemental Appendix.
We refer to Pij (Xi, Xj, σ) defined in (5.7) as the limiting choice probability. It is
the choice probability in the limiting game with a continuum of players, where each
11Assumption 7(i) could be relaxed to allow for non-i.i.d. Xi, but we do not pursue this here.
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individual i forms a link with j following the limiting strategy
Gij = 1
{
Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) + 2Z
′
jΦi (Xi, σ) Λi (Xi, σ)ωi (Xi, σ)− εij ≥ 0
}
, ∀j 6= i.
The ωi (Xi, σ) in the limiting strategy captures the expected utility of friends in
common. With the inclusion of ωi (Xi, σ) the optimal strategy of individual i is to
myopically choose to form a link as in a binary choice problem.
We now verify Assumption 7(ii) for the utility function in Section 2.
Example 5.1 Consider the expected utility in (2.5)-(2.6). Under the assumption
that the equilibrium is symmetric, we can denote
σ(Xj, Xk) = E [Gjk|X, σ]
where the order of the arguments indicates that it is the probability that j links to k.12
Therefore
Un,ij (X, σ) =β1 +X
′
iβ2 + |Xi −Xj |′ β3 + σ (Xj , Xi)β4
+
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
σ (Xj , Xk)β5 (Xi, Xj, Xk)− 1
n− 2Z
′
jVni (X, σ)Zj
By the law of large numbers the limit is
Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) =β1 +X
′
iβ2 + |Xi −Xj|′ β3 + σ (Xj, Xi) β4
+ E [σ (Xj , Xk) β5 (Xi, Xj, Xk)]
where the expectation is over Xk.
Moreover, Vni (X, σ) = (Vni,st (X, σ) , s, t = 1, . . . , T ) with
Vni,st (X, σ) =σ (xs, xt) σ (xt, xs) γ1 (Xi, xs, xt)
+
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
σ (xs, Xl) σ (xt, Xl) γ2 (Xi, xs, xt) .
12An equilibrium σ in general depends on the entire X . In this section, our focus is to approximate
the finite-n choice probability at a particular σ, so we can treat σ as a fixed matrix and ignore its
dependence on X . Any link probability in the expected utility can be viewed as a function of the
characteristics of the involved agents only.
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By the law of large numbers the limit of Vni,st (X, σ) is
Vi,st (Xi, σ) =σ (xs, xt)σ (xt, xs) γ1 (Xi, xs, xt)
+ E [σ (xs, Xl)σ (xt, Xl) γ2 (Xi, xs, xt)] ,
where the expectation is over Xl. A detailed proof can be found in the Supplemental
Appendix.
In Section 4 we proposed a two-step GMM estimator for the parameters of the
utility function. That estimator requires an instrument in the second stage and
we suggested the instrument derived from the quasi likelihood as in (4.14). This
instrument involves the derivative of the choice probability that is not everywhere
differentiable. Because the limiting choice probability is everywhere differentiable we
can use its derivative in (4.14). The instruments based on the finite-n and limiting
choice probabilities should behave similarly asymptotically.
A further simplification occurs if in the moment condition in (4.4) we replace
the finite-n choice probability by the limiting choice probability that is simpler to
compute since it does not require simulation. The formal theory that justifies the
use of the limiting model for finite-n networks requires additional results. First,
the convergence of the choice probabilities has to be uniform (over links), not just
pointwise as established here. An additional complication is the presence of multiple
equilibria. Unlike estimation based on the finite-n choice probability in Section 4
which requires no assumption on equilibrium selection, for estimation based on the
limiting choice probability to be consistent, we need to assume that the sequence
of equilibrium selection mechanisms converges to a limit, similar in spirit to the
convergence of equilibria in Menzel (2016).
In the next section we provide simulation evidence on the use of the limiting choice
probability in the instrument and/or the moment function.
6 Simulation
In this section, we conduct a simulation study of the two-step estimator proposed
in Section 4 for a range of network sizes. We consider three cases: (i) second-step
moments for the finite-n game, with instruments derived from the finite-n link proba-
bilities, (ii) second-step moments for the finite-n game, but instruments derived from
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the limiting link probabilities, (iii) second-step moments for the limiting game, with
instruments derived from the limiting link probabilities. For cases (i) and (ii) we
established consistency in Section 4. We did not show consistency for case (iii), but
our results are suggestive that the estimator is also consistent. It is computationally
the easiest case.
In the simulation study we consider the utility specification
Ui(G,X, εi) =
∑
j 6=iGij
(
β1 +Xiβ2 + |Xi −Xj| β3 + 1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,jGjkβ4
+
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,jGikGjkGkjγ − εij
)
where Xi are i.i.d. binary variables with equal probability of being 0 or 1, and εij
are i.i.d. following the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). The true parameter
values are set to (β1, β2, β3, β4, γ) = (−1, 1,−2, 1, 1). The network sizes are n =
10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500.
For each value of n, we generate the links in a single directed network as follows.
First, we compute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium by solving (2.8) for σ∗ (X) by iter-
ating that equation from a starting value.13 Second, using the equilibrium choice
probabilities to compute Un,ij (X, σ) and Vni (X, σ) we generate the links by (3.8)
after we calculate ωni (εi) for the simulated εi.
14 Each experiment is repeated 100
times. We report the means and standard errors of the estimated parameters.
Table 1 reports the two-step GMM estimates for case (i). The finite-n link prob-
ability in (4.4) is computed by simulation. We repeatedly draw εi, solve for ωni (εi)
and substitute that solution in (3.8) to obtain the optimal link choices for that εi.
The link probability is now approximated by the fraction of draws that result in a
link. For the instrument we choose the instrument derived from QMLE in (4.14).
The GMM estimator for θ is found by continous updating. The instrument is also
13We use an equilibrium in the limiting game as the initial value. This equilibrium is computed
by iterating the limiting version of (2.8) where we replace the finite-n choice probability on the
right-hand side by the limiting one.
14For small networks, generating the links by maximizing the expected utility in (2.4) with respect
to Gi by quadratic integer programming (QIP) is computationally competitive. In our simulation
study, we use QIP for n ≤ 100 and (3.8) for n > 100. We solve QIP using the solver cplexmiqp
provided in CPLEX. QIP is also a check on whether the link choices in (3.8) maximize the expected
utility. We compare the simulated link probabilities based on QIP and to those based on (3.8) and
find that they are the same.
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Table 1: Two-Step GMM Estimates Using the Finite-n Game
(Instruments from the Finite-n Game)
n β1 β2 β3 β4 γ
10 −0.995 0.958 −1.937 0.981 0.979
(0.206) (0.191) (0.402) (0.185) (0.182)
25 −1.010 1.060 −2.038 1.003 0.996
(0.066) (0.109) (0.194) (0.092) (0.098)
50 −1.003 0.999 −2.001 1.020 0.988
(0.042) (0.065) (0.097) (0.083) (0.072)
100 −0.996 0.993 −2.010 1.031 0.981
(0.023) (0.036) (0.052) (0.064) (0.055)
250 −0.998 0.999 −2.000 1.027 0.987
(0.008) (0.017) (0.020) (0.035) (0.033)
500 −1.001 1.007 −1.997 0.998 0.995
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.028) (0.019)
DGP −1 1 −2 1 1
Note: Mean estimates and standard errors from 100 re-
peated samples using the finite-n game, with the GMM in-
struments simulated independently from the finite-n game.
The choice probabilities are computed from 500 simula-
tions by either solving quadratic integer programming (for
n ≤ 100) or applying (3.8) (for n > 100).
calculated by simulation,15 and the derivative in the numerator is approximated by a
numerical derivative. Because the sample moment function is not everywhere differ-
entiable we use a derivative-free optimization solver when searching for the estimate
of θ.16 The results in Table 1 show that the two-step GMM based on the finite-n game
performs well. The mean estimates are close to the true values even for network sizes
as small as n = 25. The standard errors also decrease as the network size increases,
as expected.
Table 2 presents the results for case (ii), with the finite-n choice probability in the
15The instrument is simulated using εi that are drawn independently of those drawn to simulate
the choice probabilities in the moment function.
16We use fminsearch provided in MATLAB.
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Table 2: Two-Step GMM Estimates Using the Finite-n Game
(Instruments from the Limiting Game)
n β1 β2 β3 β4 γ
10 −1.008 1.273 −2.940 0.834 0.943
(0.438) (1.010) (3.338) (1.900) (1.004)
25 −1.017 1.012 −2.065 1.016 0.986
(0.097) (0.185) (0.268) (0.232) (0.146)
50 −1.010 0.995 −1.995 1.050 0.984
(0.052) (0.070) (0.101) (0.110) (0.094)
100 −0.995 0.991 −2.010 1.034 0.979
(0.023) (0.040) (0.050) (0.073) (0.062)
250 −0.998 1.000 −2.001 1.031 0.983
(0.008) (0.018) (0.021) (0.038) (0.036)
500 −1.001 1.010 −2.000 0.999 0.989
(0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.034) (0.025)
DGP −1 1 −2 1 1
Note: Mean estimates and standard errors from 100 re-
peated samples using the finite-n game, with the GMM in-
struments calculated from the limiting game. The finite-n
choice probabilities are computed from 500 simulations by
either solving quadratic integer programming (for n ≤ 100)
or applying (3.8) (for n > 100).
moment function in (4.4), but in the instrument in (4.14) we replace the finite-n choice
probability and its derivative by the limiting choice probability and its derivative. The
limiting choice probability and its derivative need not be computed by simulation and
the choice probability is differentiable everywhere with respect to θ. We find that for
small networks (e.g. n = 10) the estimator is slightly biased. The standard errors
are larger than those in case (i). For larger networks, the standard errors in cases (i)
and (ii) are close, suggesting that in larger networks, the computationally convenient
limiting game can be used without sacrificing precision.
In Table 3 we consider case (iii), where in both the moment function and the
instrument we use the limiting choice probabilities. This yields a moment condition
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Table 3: Two-Step QMLE Estimates Using the Limiting Game
n β1 β2 β3 β4 γ
10 −1.152 2.806 −6.469 −2.626 −0.194
(2.284) (3.004) (3.649) (8.890) (6.438)
25 −0.719 2.639 −3.899 −1.835 −0.887
(0.447) (2.029) (2.152) (3.710) (3.948)
50 −0.986 1.058 −2.064 0.858 0.909
(0.126) (0.499) (0.499) (0.921) (0.551)
100 −0.995 1.008 −2.007 0.985 0.959
(0.034) (0.084) (0.084) (0.165) (0.208)
250 −1.001 1.004 −2.003 1.009 0.969
(0.014) (0.039) (0.037) (0.075) (0.173)
500 −1.001 1.001 −2.000 1.006 0.986
(0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.047) (0.103)
DGP −1 1 −2 1 1
Note: Mean estimates and standard errors from 100 re-
peated samples using the limiting game, equivalent to
GMM estimates with both the moment function and the
instruments calculated based on the limiting game.
that is equal to the first-order condition from QMLE based on the limiting game.
This case is computationally convenient, because no simulation is needed. The results
show that the estimates are off in small networks. However, the bias disappears as
the network size grows. This suggests that the estimator solved from the limiting
moment condition is consistent. The standard errors in Table 3 are larger than those
in Tables 1-2.
In sum, the simulation results suggest that the two-step estimation procedure
based on the finite-n game gives good estimates for the parameters even in relatively
small networks. For large networks, estimators based on the limiting game are as
good as those based on the finite-n game. This is encouraging given that the limiting
choice probabilities are much easier to compute than the finite-n ones.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a new method for the estimation of network formation
games using data from a single large network. We consider a network formation
game with incomplete information, where the utility of an agent in a network can
be nonseparable in her own link choices to accommodate the utility from friends in
common. We propose a new approach in which the optimal link decision of each
agent is a set of binary link choices if an auxiliary variable is included. Based on this
representation we analyze the dependence between the link choices of an agent, and
its effect on the estimation of the parameters of the utility function. We propose a
two-step estimation procedure where we estimate the link choice probabilities non-
parameterically in the first step and estimate the utility function parameters in the
second step. This two-step procedure requires weak assumptions about equilibrium
selection, is simple to compute, and provides consistent and asymptotically normal
estimators for the parameters that account for the link dependence.
Some extensions of our approach are discussed in Section 5. We consider an
unrestricted expected utility of friends in common, undirected networks and the limit
of the link choice probabilities. Another important extension is to relax the i.i.d.
assumption on the unobservables and introduce an individual effect, similar to that
in Graham (2017). This creates stronger and non-vanishing link dependence within
an agent. Ridder and Sheng (2017) discuss the estimation and inference in this case.
The Legendre transform may be useful in other applications, where an agent
chooses between a large number of overlapping alternatives that exhibit strategic
complementarity. Such models are challenging to analyze because the optimal decision
of an agent generally does not have a closed form. Our approach may facilitate the
econometric analysis of these models.
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Supplemental Appendix
This supplemental appendix contains all the proofs in the paper. We use ‖.‖ to denote
the Euclidean norm. If the argument is a matrix A the norm is the matrix Euclidean
norm ‖A‖ =√tr (A′A).
S.1 Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. It suffices to show the first equality as the second equality
follows immediately from (3.5). By the real spectral decomposition of Vi (X, σ), the
double-sum term in the expected utility in (3.2) satisfies
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
GijGikZ
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk
=
(∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
j
)
Vi (X, σ)
(∑
k 6=i
GikZk
)
=
(∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
j
)
Φi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)Φ
′
i (X, σ)
(∑
k 6=i
GikZk
)
=
(∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
jΦi (X, σ)
)
Λi (X, σ)
(∑
k 6=i
GikΦ
′
i (X, σ)Zk
)
= (n− 1)2
T∑
t=1
λit (X, σ)
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
jφit (X, σ)
)2
Combining this with (3.2) yields the first equality in (3.6). The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. From Proposition 3.1, the expected utility can be written
1
as
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij (X, σ)− εij)
+
T∑
t=1
λit (X, σ)max
ωt∈R
{
2 (n− 1)
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
jφit (X, σ)ωt −
(n− 1)2
n− 2 ω
2
t
}
=max
ω∈RT
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
j
T∑
t=1
φit (X, σ) λit (X, σ)ωt − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2
T∑
t=1
λit (X, σ)ω
2
t
=max
ω∈RT
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λi (X, σ)ω (S.1)
where ω = (ωt)∀t ∈ RT . The second equality holds because λit (X, σ) ≥ 0, t =
1, . . . , T , by Assumption 3.
Denote by Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ) the objective function of the maximization problem
in (S.1)
Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ) =
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λi (X, σ)ω
From (S.1), the maximized expected utility can be derived from
max
Gi
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
=max
Gi
max
ω
Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ)
=max
ω
max
Gi
Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ)
=max
ω
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ) (S.2)
2
where Πi (ω, εi, X, σ) is defined in (3.9). The second equality in (S.2) follows be-
cause maxω Π˜i(Gi, ω) ≤ maxωmaxGi Π˜i(Gi, ω) for all Gi, so maxGi maxω Π˜i(Gi, ω) ≤
maxωmaxGi Π˜i(Gi, ω), and similarly we can prove the other direction. The last equal-
ity follows from the definition of Πi (ω, εi, X, σ). The result in (S.2) shows that the
maximum expected utility can be obtained by solving the last maximization problem
in (S.2) or equivalently (3.9).
By the definition of Gi (X, εi, σ) and ωi (X, εi, σ), we have
max
ω
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ)
=Π˜i (Gi (X, εi, σ) , ωi (X, εi, σ) ;X, εi, σ)
≤max
ω
Π˜i (Gi (X, εi, σ) , ω, εi, X, σ)
=E [Ui(Gi (X, εi, σ) , G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ] (S.3)
where the last equality comes from (S.1). Combining (S.2) and (S.3) we see that
the inequality in (S.3) becomes an equality. Therefore, Gi (X, εi, σ) is an optimal
solution.
As for the uniqueness, Gi (X, εi, σ) is unique almost surely because εi has a contin-
uous distribution by Assumption 1, so two link decisions achieve the same expected
utility with probability zero. To show the uniqueness of Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ), note
that (S.3) implies that ωi (X, εi, σ) is an optimal solution to the maximization prob-
lem maxω Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ) evaluated at Gi = Gi (X, εi, σ), so ωi (X, εi, σ) satisfies
the first-order condition
Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ) =
1
n− 1Λi (X, σ) Φ
′
i (X, σ)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj (S.4)
Since Gi (X, εi, σ) is unique almost surely, so is Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ). The proof is
complete.
Lemma S.1 Suppose Assumption 1-3 are satisfied. An ωi (εi, X, σ) that solves the
maximization problem in (3.9) satisfies the first-order condition
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij ≥ 0
}
Λi (X, σ) Φ
′
i (X, σ)Zj
= Λi (X, σ)ω
3
almost surely.
Proof. Omit X and σ in the notation. Since Πi (ω, εi) is sub-differentiable at all ω,
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by optimality of ωi (εi), Πi (ω, εi) has subgradient 0 at ωi (εi), that is, ωi (εi) satisfies
the first-order condition
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω − εij > 0
}
ΛiΦ
′
iZj − Λiω
= − 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω − εij = 0
}
diag (τ) ΛiΦ
′
iZj, (S.5)
for some τ = (τ1, . . . , τT ) ∈ [0, 1]T . Define the right-hand side of (S.5) as ∆n (ω, εi).
For any ω,
Pr (‖∆n (ω, εi)‖ > 0|X, σ)
≤ Pr
(
∃j 6= i, Uij + 2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω = εij
∣∣∣∣X, σ
)
≤
∑
j 6=i
Pr
(
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω = εij
∣∣∣∣X, σ
)
= 0, (S.6)
because εij has a continuous distribution. Hence the first-order condition (S.5) holds
with ∆n (ω, εi) replaced by 0 with probability 1. By (S.6) again, we obtain
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiωi (εi)− εij ≥ 0
}
ΛiΦ
′
iZj − Λiωi (εi) = 0, a.s.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Omit X and σ in the notation. By Lemma S.1, ωi (εi) is
a solution to the first-order condition
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω ≥ εij
}
ΛiΦ
′
iZj = Λiω, a.s.. (S.7)
Note that the first-order condition could have multiple solutions, and among these
local solutions, ωi (εi) is the unique maximizer of Πi (ω, εi). For this reason we refer
17Notice that the function max {x, 0} is differentiable for x 6= 0 and sub-differentiable for x = 0
with subderivatives in [0, 1].
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to ωi (εi) as the global solution.
For any ω ∈ RT , define the choice function gi (ω; εi) = (gij(ω; εij), j 6= i) : RT →
{0, 1}n−1 by
gij (ω; εij) = 1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω ≥ εij
}
, ∀j 6= i. (S.8)
The first-order condition (S.7) defines a system of equations over ω
Λiω =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
gij (ω; εij) ΛiΦ
′
iZj, a.s.. (S.9)
On the other hand, for any gi = (gij , j 6= i) ∈ {0, 1}n−1, define the function ωi (gi) :
{0, 1}n−1 → RT by
ωi (gi) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
gijΦ
′
iZj . (S.10)
We derive a system of equations over gi
gij = 1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiωi (gi) ≥ εij
}
, ∀j 6= i. (S.11)
We show that with probability 1 there is a one-to-one mapping between the solutions
to (S.9) and the solutions to (S.11).
First, for any local solution ωli (εi) that solves system (S.9), the choice function
gi (ω; εi) evaluated at ω
l
i (εi), i.e., gi
(
ωli (εi) ; εi
)
, is a solution to system (S.11) with
probability 1. To see this, note that by the first-order condition in (S.9) and the
definition of ωi (gi) in (S.10) ω
l
i (εi) satisfies
Λiω
l
i (εi) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
ωli (εi) ; εij
)
ΛiΦ
′
iZj, a.s.
= Λiωi
(
gi
(
ωli (εi) ; εi
))
. (S.12)
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Then by the definition of gi (ω; εi) in (S.8), for any j 6= i,
gij
(
ωli (εi) ; εij
)
=1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω
l
i (εi) ≥ εij
}
=1
{
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiωi
(
gi
(
ωli (εi) ; εi
)) ≥ εij
}
, a.s..
This shows that gij
(
ωli (εi) ; εij
)
satisfies system (S.11) with probability 1. Second, for
two distinct ωl1i (εi) 6= ωl2i (εi), by (S.12), with probability 1, we have gi
(
ωl1i (εi) ; εi
) 6=
gi
(
ωl2i (εi) ; εi
)
. Therefore, there is a one-to-one mapping between the solutions to
(S.9) and (S.11) with probability 1.
The equivalence between systems (S.9) and (S.11) motivates us to analyze the
relationship between ωi (εi) and εi through the relationship between the solutions to
(S.11) and εi. By the definition of ωi (gi) in (S.10), write system (S.11) explicitly as
gij = 1
{
Uij +
2
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
gikZ
′
jViZk ≥ εij
}
, ∀j 6= i, a.s. (S.13)
For any gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1, define the set
E li (gi) =
{
εi ∈ Rn−1 : gi satisfies (S.13)
}
. (S.14)
This set can be regarded as the collection of εi that support gi as a solution to
(S.13). Note that since εi has support on R
n−1, the set E li (gi) is nonempty for all
gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1.
As discussed, system (S.13) may have multiple solutions, resembling the presence
of multiple equilibria in entry games (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Tamer, 2003). In
particular, it is possible that the sets in (S.14) for two different gi and g
′
i overlap and
in the overlapping area both gi and g
′
i satisfy (S.13). For example, assume that all
elements in Vi are positive so link choices are strategic complements. In the region of
εi where
Uij < εij ≤ Uij + 2
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
Z ′jViZk, ∀j 6= i,
we find that both (gij = 1, j 6= i) and (gij = 0, j 6= i) are solutions to (S.13).
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Unlike in entry games where equilibrium selection mechanisms are typically un-
known, in our case we have a natural selection mechanism. Recall that from Propo-
sition 3.2 the optimal link decision Gi (εi) = (Gij (εi) , j 6= i) ∈ {0, 1}n−1 is given by
the choice function (S.8) evaluated at the global solution ωi (εi), i.e.,
Gij (εi) = gij (ωi (εi) ; εij) , ∀j 6= i.
From our earlier discussion we can see that Gij (εi) satisfies (S.13). For a given
εi ∈ Rn−1, system (S.13) could have multiple solutions, and among all such solutions
Gij (εi) is selected because it is the choice function evaluated at ωi (εi), the global
maximizer of the objective function
Πi (ω, εi) =
∑
j 6=i
[
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λiω.
To further characterize the selection mechanism, we examine the objective func-
tion Πi (ω, εi) evaluated at the local solutions. Note that for any ω
l ∈ RT that solves
the system (S.9), we have
Λiω
l =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
ωl; εij
)
ΛiΦ
′
iZj , a.s.
Hence, Πi
(
ωl, εi
)
can be represented as
Πi
(
ωl, εi
)
=
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
ωl; εij
)(
Uij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦiΛiω
l − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
ωl; εij
)
ΛiΦ
′
iZj
)′
ωl, a.s.
=
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
ωl; εij
)(
Uij +
n− 1
n− 2Z
′
jΦiΛiω
l − εij
)
=
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
ωl; εij
)(
Uij +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
gik
(
ωl; εik, θ, p
)
Z ′jViZk − εij
)
, a.s. (S.15)
This indicates that Πi
(
ωl, εi
)
can be regarded as a function of the link decision
7
gi
(
ωl; εi
)
that corresponds to ωl.
By the global optimality of ωi (εi) we have Πi (ωi (εi) , εi) ≥ Πi
(
ωl, εi
)
for all ωl
that solves the first-order condition (S.9). By the represetation of Πi
(
ωl, εi
)
in (S.15)
and the equivalence between (S.9) (thus (S.7)) and (S.13), if Gi (εi) takes a value
gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1, then gi must satisfy both (S.13) and
∑
j 6=i
gij
(
Uij +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
gikZ
′
jViZk − εij
)
≥
∑
j 6=i
glij
(
Uij +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
glikZ
′
jViZk − εij
)
(S.16)
almost surely, for all gli that solve (S.13). We can view (S.16) as a selection criterion
that determines which solution to (S.13) is selected.
Therefore, for any gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1, we can define the set
Ei (gi) =
{
εi ∈ Rn−1 : gi satisfies both (S.13) and (S.16)
}
. (S.17)
This set is the collection of εi that support gi as the unique optimal decision, i.e.,
for any εi ∈ Ei (gi), we have Gi (εi) = gi. The uniqueness implies that if gi 6= g′i,
the sets Ei (gi) and Ei (g′i) are disjoint. The collection of such sets Ei (gi) for all
gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1 thus forms a partition of the space of εi, with each region in the
partition corresponding to a unique optimal link decision, similarly as in entry games
(Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Tamer, 2003). The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We follow the proof in Leung (2015, Theorem 1). We
organize the choice probabilities in an n × 2n−1 matrix σ (X). The ith row has
individual i’s choice probabilities σi (X) = {σi (gi|X) , gi ∈ Gi}. The entries in the
row sum to 1. The set of such matrices is Σ (X). With row i of σ (X) we associate
Xi.
Let Σs (X) ⊂ Σ (X) be the subset of matrices of choice probabilities, such that if
Xi = Xj then σi (X) = σj (X), i.e., rows i and j are identical.
If we organize the choice probabilities in (2.7) in an n× 2n−1 matrix P (X, σ), it
maps the matrix σ to a matrix of choice probabilities in Σ (X). An equilibrium is a
fixed point of this mapping. Because we focus on symmetric equilibria in Σs (X), we
have to show that P (X, σ) is a continuous mapping from Σs (X) to Σs (X) and that
Σs (X) is convex and compact.
First, the mapping P (X, σ) maps Σs (X) to itself. Let σ (X) ∈ Σs (X). If Xi =
8
Xj, then in the expected utilities of i and j, (2.5) and (2.6) are equal for i and
j. Because εi and εj have the same distribution, rows i and j of P (X, σ (X)) are
identical, so indeed P (X, σ (X)) ∈ Σs (X).
Second, a convex combination of matrices σ (X) , σ˜ (X) ∈ Σs (X) is a matrix with
rows that sum to 1 and that rows i and j are identical if Xi = Xj . The convex
combination is therefore in Σs (X).
Third, Σs (X) is bounded. It is also closed. Let
{
σk (X) , k = 1, 2, . . .
}
be a
sequence in Σs (X) that converges to a limit. Then for all k the rows of σk (X) sum
to 1 and rows i and j are identical if Xi = Xj. So the limit has the same properties
and is therefore in Σs (X).
Finally, the mapping P (X, σ) is continuous on Σs (X). This is shown in Lemma
S.4 in the Supplemental Appendix.
We conclude that by Brower’s fixed point theorem, P (X, σ) has a fixed point in
Σs (X). The proof is complete.
S.2 Proofs in Section 4
S.2.1 Consistency
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We follow the consistency proof in Newey and McFadden
(1994). A complication is the presence of the first-stage parameter pn. Fix δ > 0. Let
Bδ (θ0) = {θ ∈ Θ : ‖θ − θ0‖ < δ} be an open δ-ball centered at θ0. If
∥∥∥Ψn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥ <
infθ∈Θ\Bδ(θ0) ‖Ψn (θ, pn)‖, then θˆn /∈ Θ\Bδ (θ0), or equivalently, θˆn ∈ Bδ (θ0). There-
fore,
Pr
(∥∥∥θˆn − θ0∥∥∥ < δ∣∣∣X, pn)
≥Pr
(∥∥∥Ψn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥ < inf
θ∈Θ\Bδ(θ0)
‖Ψn (θ, pn)‖
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
. (S.18)
Because by Assumption 4(i)-(ii) and Lemma S.4
inf
θ∈Θ\Bδ(θ0)
‖Ψn (θ, pn)‖ > 0,
the right-hand side in (S.18) goes to 1, if
∥∥∥Ψn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥ = op(1). (S.19)
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Now by the triangle inequality
∥∥∥Ψn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pn)−Ψn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥+ sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, pn)−Ψn (θ, pn)∥∥∥ .
By the uniform LLN in Lemma S.3 the second term of the last inequality is op(1), so
we need to show that
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥ = op(1).
We have
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pˆn)∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pˆn)− Ψˆn (θˆn, pn)∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pˆn)∥∥∥+ sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, pˆn)− Ψˆn (θ, pn)∥∥∥ ,
and
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θˆn, pˆn)∥∥∥ = op(1) by (4.5), so we need to show that the second term is also
op(1).
For any p ∈ [0, 1]T 2, we have
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, p)− Ψˆn (θ, pn)∥∥∥
≤ 1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥Wˆn,ij (Pn,ij (θ, p)− Pn,ij (θ, pn))∥∥∥
≤ max
i,j=1,...,n
∥∥∥Wˆn,ij∥∥∥ max
i,j=1,...,n
sup
θ∈Θ
‖Pn,ij (θ, p)− Pn,ij (θ, pn)‖
= max
i,j=1,...,n
∥∥∥Wˆn,ij∥∥∥ max
s,t=1,...,T
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥Pn,(st) (θ, p)− Pn,(st) (θ, pn)∥∥ ,
where Pn,(st) (θ, p) represents the value of Pn,ij (θ, p) if Xi = xs and Xj = xt. By
Lemma S.4 Pn,(st)(θ, p) is continuous in θ and p at any θ ∈ Θ and pn. Since Θ is a
compact set, this function is uniformly continuous in θ on Θ and pointwise continuous
in p at pn.
If a function f(θ, p) is uniformly continuous in θ on Θ and pointwise continuous
in p at pn, then supθ∈Θ ‖f(θ, p)− f(θ, pn)‖ is continuous in p at pn. This is true
because for any η > 0 there is a δ such that ‖(θ′, p) − (θ, pn)‖ < δ implies that
‖f(θ′, p)−f(θ, pn)‖ < η where δ does not depend on θ, θ′, and p. Now if ‖p−pn‖ < δ,
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we have also ‖(θ, p)− (θ, pn)‖ < δ for all θ, so
sup
θ∈Θ
‖f(θ, p)− f(θ, pn)‖ < η.
By letting f(θ, p) = Pn,(st)(θ, p), we derive that supθ∈Θ
∥∥Pn,(st)(θ, p)− Pn,(st) (θ, pn)∥∥
is continuous in p at pn. This together with Assumption (4)(iii) implies that the
function supθ∈Θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, p)− Ψˆn (θ, pn)∥∥∥ is continuous in p at pn.
By the continuous mapping theorem and the consistency of pˆn in Lemma S.2,
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, pˆn)− Ψˆn (θ, pn)∥∥∥ p→ 0,
as n→∞, so (S.19) holds and weak consistency is proven.
Lemma S.2 (Consistency of pˆn) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 4(iv) are sat-
isfied. The first-step estimator pˆn is consistent for pn, i.e., for any δ > 0,
Pr (‖pˆn − pn‖ > δ|X, pn)→ 0
as n→∞.
Proof. Recall that pˆn = (pˆn,st, s, t = 1, . . . , T ) and pn = (pn,st, s, t = 1, . . . , T ), where
pˆn,st is the link frequency of pairs with the characteristics xs and xt
pˆn,st =
∑
i
∑
j 6=iGn,ij1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
and pn,st is the population link probability of such pairs
pn,st = E [Gn,ij|Xi = xs, Xj = xt, X, pn] ,
so
E [ (Gn,ij − pn,st)|X, pn] 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt} = 0 (S.20)
By Chebyshev’s inequality, for any δ > 0,
Pr (‖pˆn − pn‖ > δ|X, pn) ≤ 1
δ2
E
[‖pˆn − pn‖2∣∣X, pn] .
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It suffices to show that E
[‖pˆn − pn‖2∣∣X, pn]→ 0 as n→∞.
Observe that
E
[‖pˆn − pn‖2∣∣X, pn] = E
[∑
s
∑
t
(pˆn,st − pn,st)2
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
=
∑
s
∑
t
E
[
(pˆn,st − pn,st)2
∣∣X, pn] . (S.21)
We can write
pˆn,st − pn,st =
1
n(n−1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i (Gn,ij − pn,st) 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
1
n(n−1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
Therefore, the conditional variance of pˆn,st − pn,st given X and pn has a numerator
1
n2 (n− 1)2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
E
[
(Gn,ij − pn,st)2
∣∣X, pn] 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
+
1
n2 (n− 1)2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
E [ (Gn,ij − pn,st) (Gn,ik − pn,st)|X, pn]
· 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt, Xk = xt}
+
1
n2 (n− 1)2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
∑
l 6=k
E [ (Gn,ij − pn,st) (Gn,kl − pn,st)|X, pn]
· 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt, Xk = xs, Xl = xt} (S.22)
Because the link choices are independent between individuals, the last term in (S.22)
is 0 by (S.20). Further,
E
[
(Gn,ij − pn,st)2
∣∣X, pn] 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt} ≤ 1
and
E [ (Gn,ij − pn,st) (Gn,ik − pn,st)|X, pn] 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt, Xk = xt} ≤ 1
so the numerator in (S.22) is bounded by
n (n− 1)
n2 (n− 1)2 +
n (n− 1) (n− 2)
n2 (n− 1)2 =
1
n
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Because 1
n(n−1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt} converges to a strictly positive limit by
Assumption 4(iv), the denominator of the conditional variance of pˆn,st−pn,st converges
to the square of that limit. Therefore, the conditional variance of pˆn,st − pn,st is o (1)
for each s and t. This implies
E
[‖pˆn − pn‖2∣∣X, pn]→ 0
and pˆn is consistent for pn.
Lemma S.3 (Uniform LLN for Sample Moments) Suppose that Assumptions 1-
3 and 4(iii) are satisfied. For any δ > 0,
Pr
(
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, pn)−Ψn (θ, pn)∥∥∥ > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
→ 0 (S.23)
as n→∞.
Proof. By the definition of Ψˆn and Ψn
Ψˆn (θ, pn)−Ψn (θ, pn)
=
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ, pn))−Wn,ij (E [Gn,ij|X, pn]− Pn,ij (θ, pn))
=
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(
Wˆn,ij −Wn,ij
)
(Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ, pn))
+
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn]) (S.24)
The first term in the last expression in (S.24) is op (1) uniformly over θ ∈ Θ because
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(
Wˆn,ij −Wn,ij
)
(Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ, pn))
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ maxi,j=1,...,n
∥∥∥Wˆn,ij −Wn,ij∥∥∥
= op (1)
by Assumption 4(iii). Write the last term in (S.24) as
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn]) = 1
n
∑
i
Yni
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with
Yni =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn])
Note that 1
n
∑
i Yni does not depend on θ. We prove that it is op (1) following the
proof for a pointwise LLN. By Chebyshev’s inequality, for any δ > 0,
Pr
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
∑
i
Yni
∥∥∥∥∥ > δ
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤ 1
δ2
E


∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
∑
i
Yni
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣X, pn

 .
Note that conditional on X and pn, the random variables Yni, i = 1, . . . , n, are
independent with mean 0. Therefore, 1
n
∑
i Yni has the conditional variance
E


∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
∑
i
Yni
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣X, pn


=
1
n2
∑
i
E
[‖Yni‖2∣∣X, pn]
=
1
n2 (n− 1)2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
W ′n,ijE
[
(Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn])2
∣∣X, pn]Wn,ij
+
1
n2 (n− 1)2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
W ′n,ijE [(Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn])
· (Gn,ik − E [Gn,ik|X, pn])|X, pn]Wn,ik
Since
E
[
(Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn])2
∣∣X, pn] ≤ 1
and
|E [ (Gn,ij − E [Gn,ij|X, pn]) (Gn,ik − E [Gn,ik|X, pn])|X, pn]| ≤ 1
the conditional variance is bounded by
1
n (n− 1) maxi,j=1,...,n ‖Wn,ij‖
2 +
n− 2
n (n− 1) maxi,j,k=1,...,n ‖Wn,ij‖ ‖Wn,ik‖ = o (1)
by Assumption 4(iii), so
1
n
∑
i
Yni = op (1) .
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Combining the results we obtain
sup
θ
∥∥∥Ψˆn (θ, pn)−Ψn (θ, pn)∥∥∥ = op (1)
as n→∞.
Lemma S.4 (Continuity of CCP) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. Given
X, the conditional choice probability Pn,ij (θ, p) is continuous in θ and p.
Proof. Recall that
Pn,ij (θ, p)
=
∫
1
{
Un,ij (θ, p) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦni (θ, p) Λni (θ, p)ωni (εi, θ, p) ≥ εij
}
fεi (εi; θ) dεi,
where fεi represents the density of εi. By (2.5), (2.6), (3.3) and Assumption 1,
Un,ij (θ, p) and fεi (εi; θ) are continuous in θ and p. The challenge is that ωni (εi, θ, p)
is a function of εi and it depends on θ and p. To establish the continuity of Pn,ij (θ, p),
we need to investigate how ωni (εi, θ, p) varies with θ and p.
In Corollary 3.3, we show that ωni (εi, θ, p) satisfies
Φni (θ, p) Λni (θ, p)ωni (εi, θ, p) =
1
n− 1
∑
k 6=i
Gn,ik (εi, θ, p) Vni (θ, p)Zk, a.s.,
where Gni (εi, θ, p) = (Gn,ij (εi, θ, p) , j 6= i) ∈ {0, 1}n−1 is the optimal decision given
in Theorem 3.2. Therefore Pn,ij (θ, p) can be expressed as
Pn,ij (θ, p)
=
∫
1
{
Un,ij (θ, p) +
2
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
Gn,ik (εi, θ, p)Z
′
jVni (θ, p)Zk ≥ εij
}
fεi (εi; θ) dεi.
From Corollary 3.3, the optimal decisionGni (εi, θ, p) = gni for some gni ∈ {0, 1}n−1
if and only if εi ∈ Ei (gni, θ, p), where the set Ei (gni, θ, p) is defined in (S.17)
Ei (gni, θ, p) =
{
εi ∈ Rn−1 : gni satisfies both (S.13) and (S.16)
}
.
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For any gni ∈ {0, 1}n−1, the equations in (S.13) define an orthant in Rn−1
εij
{
< Un,ij (θ, p) +
2
n−2
∑
k 6=i gn,ikZ
′
jVni (θ, p)Zk if gn,ij = 1
≥ Un,ij (θ, p) + 2n−2
∑
k 6=i gn,ikZ
′
jVni (θ, p)Zk if gn,ij = 0
, ∀j 6= i. (S.25)
Both Un,ij (θ, p) and Vni (θ, p) are continuous in θ and p, so the boundary of this
orthant is continuous in θ and p. Moreover, the inequalities in (S.16) define half-
spaces in Rn−1 given by the hyperplanes
∑
j 6=i
(
gn,ij − gln,ij
)
εij
≤
∑
j 6=i
(
gn,ij − gln,ij
)
Un,ij (θ, p) +
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
(
gln.ik − gln,ik
)
Z ′jVni (θ, p)Zk, (S.26)
for all glni that solve (S.13) with probability 1. While the set of solutions to (S.13) for
a given εi could be discontinuous in θ and p (i.e., some link choices in an optimal g
l
ni
may switch from 0 to 1 or the opposite as θ or p changes), this occurs with probability
zero because εi follows a continuous distribution by Assumption 1(i). Since the right-
hand side of (S.26) is continuous in θ and p, the boundaries of such half-spaces are
also continuous in θ and p.
The set Ei (gni, θ, p) is the intersection of the orthant in (S.25) and the half-spaces
defined by (S.26). Because continuity is preserved under max and min operations, if
two sets have boundaries that are continuous in θ and p, their intersection must also
have a boundary that is continuous in θ and p. Therefore, the set Ei (gni, θ, p) has a
boundary that is continuous in θ and p.
Partitioning the space of εi into a collection of the sets Ei (gni, θ, p) for all gni ∈
{0, 1}n−1, we can write Pn,ij (θ, p) as
Pn,ij (θ, p)
=
∑
gni∈{0,1}n−1
gn,ij=1
∫
Ei(gni,θ,p)
1
{
Un,ij (θ, p) +
2
n− 2
∑
k 6=i
gn,ikZ
′
jVni (θ, p)Zk ≥ εij
}
fεi (εi; θ) dεi
=
∑
gni∈{0,1}n−1
gn,ij=1
∫
Ei(gni,θ,p)
fεi (εi; θ) dεi. (S.27)
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For each gni, the set Ei (gni; θ, p) has a boundary that is continuous in θ and p, so
each integral in the summation in (S.27) is continuous in θ and p by Assumption 1(i).
The proof is complete.
S.2.2 Asymptotic Distribution
In this section, we prove that the asymptotic distribution of θˆn is as in Theorem 4.2.
We first derive the asymptotic properties of ωni in a sequence of lemmas. Then we
use these lemmas to prove Theorem 4.2.
Asymptotic Properties of ωni (εi) In the derivation of the asymptotic properties
of ωni (εi) we suppress the dependence on θ0 and pn to simplify the notation. Recall
that ωni (εi) maximizes Πni (ω, εi)
ωni (εi) = arg max
ω∈RT
Πni (ω, εi) ,
where
Πni (ω, εi) =
∑
j 6=i
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω.
Let Π∗ni (ω) denote the conditional expectation of Πni (ω, εi) given X and pn
Π∗ni (ω) =
∑
j 6=i
E
[[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω
and ω∗ni is a maximizer of Π
∗
ni (ω)
ω∗ni = arg max
ω∈RT
Π∗ni (ω) .
In the subsequent lemmas, we establish that ωni (εi) is consistent for ω
∗
ni (Lemma
S.5). Moreover, ωni (εi) has an asymptotically linear representation (Lemma S.7)
and satisfies certain uniformity properties (Lemma S.8). Additional results that are
needed to prove these lemmas are in Lemma S.6 and S.9.
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Remark S.1 By Lemma S.1 we have
Λniωni (εi) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniωni (εi)− εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj
almost surely. We set ωni,t (εi) = 0 if λni,t = 0, t = 1, . . . , T , so
ωni (εi) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniωni (εi)− εij ≥ 0
}
Λ+niΛniΦ
′
niZj
where Λ+ni is the generalized inverse of Λni. Then
‖ωni (εi)‖ ≤ max
j 6=i
∥∥Λ+niΛniΦ′niZj∥∥ ≤ max
j 6=i
∥∥Λ+niΛni∥∥ ‖Φ′ni‖ ‖Zj‖ ≤ T <∞
Therefore ωni (εi) is bounded, and without loss of generality we can assume that ω lies
in a compact set Ω ⊆ RT as in Assumption 5(i).
Lemma S.5 (Consistency of ωni) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 5(i)-(ii) are
satisfied. For i = 1, . . . , n, ωni (εi) is consistent for ω
∗
ni, i.e., for any δ > 0
Pr (‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖ > δ|X, pn)→ 0
as n→∞.
Proof. We follow the proof in Newey and McFadden (1994). Fix δ > 0. Let
Bδ (ω∗ni) = {ω ∈ Ω : ‖ω − ω∗ni‖ < δ} be an open δ-ball centered at ω∗ni. If Π∗ni (ωni (εi)) >
supω∈Ω\Bδ(ω∗ni) Π
∗
ni (ω), ωni (εi) /∈ Ω\Bδ (ω∗ni), or equivalently, ωni (εi) ∈ Bδ (ω∗ni). There-
fore,
Pr (‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖ < δ|X, pn)
≥Pr

Π∗ni (ωni (εi)) > sup
ω∈Ω\Bδ(ω∗ni)
Π∗ni (ω)
∣∣∣∣∣∣X, pn


=Pr

Π∗ni (ω∗ni)− Π∗ni (ωni (εi)) < Π∗ni (ω∗ni)− sup
ω∈Ω\Bδ(ω∗ni)
Π∗ni (ω)
∣∣∣∣∣∣X, pn

 . (S.28)
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By Assumption 5(i)-(ii)
1
n− 1

Π∗ni (ω∗ni)− sup
ω∈Ω\Bδ(ω∗ni)
Π∗ni (ω)

 > 0,
so the right-hand size of (S.28) goes to 1 if
1
n− 1 (Π
∗
ni (ω
∗
ni)−Π∗ni (ωni (εi))) ≤ op (1) . (S.29)
By the optimality of ωni (εi) we have
0 ≤ Π∗ni (ω∗ni)− Π∗ni (ωni (εi)) =Π∗ni (ω∗ni)− Πni (ω∗ni, εi) + Πni (ω∗ni, εi)− Π∗ni (ωni (εi))
≤Π∗ni (ω∗ni)− Πni (ω∗ni, εi) + Πni (ωni (εi) , εi)− Π∗ni (ωni (εi))
≤2 sup
ω∈Ω
|Πni (ω, εi)− Π∗ni (ω)| .
By the uniform LLN for Πni (ω, εi) in Lemma S.6,
sup
ω∈Ω
1
n− 1 |Πni (ω, εi)− Π
∗
ni (ω)| = op (1) .
so (S.29) holds and the consistency is proved.
Lemma S.6 (Uniform LLN for Πni) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 5 are sat-
isfied. Then for any δ > 0,
Pr
(
sup
ω∈Ω
1
n− 1 |(Πni (ω, εi)−Π
∗
ni (ω))| > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
→ 0 (S.30)
as n→∞.
Proof. Recall that
Πni (ω, εi) =
∑
j 6=i
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω
and
Π∗ni (ω) =
∑
j 6=i
E
([
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω.
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Define
pin,ij (ω, εij) =
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
.
Hence,
1
n− 1 (Πni (ω, εi)− Π
∗
ni (ω)) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(pin,ij (ω, εij)− E [pin,ij (ω, εij)|X, pn]) .
By Assumption 5(i)
∣∣Z ′jΦniΛniω∣∣ ≤ ‖Φni‖ ‖Λni‖ sup
ω∈Ω
‖ω‖ ≤
√
T max
t=1,...,T
λni,t sup
ω∈Ω
‖ω‖ ≤M <∞
Therefore for all ω ∈ Ω
pin,ij (ω, εij)
2 ≤
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 M − εij
)2
with
E
[(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 M − εij
)2∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
<∞
Also pin,ij (ω, εij) is continuous in ω on a compact set Ω. Therefore the conditions
of the uniform LLN for triangular arrays are satisfied (Jennrich, 1969) and (S.30)
follows.
Lemma S.7 (Asymptotically linear representation of ωni (εi)) Suppose that As-
sumptions 1-3 and 5 are satisfied. For each i = 1, . . . , n, ωni (εi) has an asymptotically
linear representation
ωni (εi)− ω∗ni =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) + r
ω
ni (εi) (S.31)
as n→∞, with the influence function ϕωn,ij (ω∗ni, εij) ∈ RT given by
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) = −∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+ ϕpin,ij (ω∗ni, εij) , (S.32)
where the function ϕpin,ij (ω, εij) ∈ RT is defined by
ϕpin,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj − Λniω, (S.33)
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and
∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) =
2
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZjZ
′
jΦniΛni − Λni,
(S.34)
which by Assumption 5(iii) has the generalized inverse
∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+
=Λ+ni
(
2
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZjZ
′
jΦni − IT
)−1
.
Moreover, the remainder rωni (εi) in (S.31) satisfies
rωni (εi) = op
(
1√
n
)
. (S.35)
Proof. Define Γni (ω, εi) ∈ RT
Γni (ω, εi) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj − Λniω
=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕpin,ij (ω, εij) ,
where ϕpin,ij (ω, εij) ∈ RT is defined in (S.33). By Lemma S.1 ωni (εi) satisfies the
first-order condition
Γni (ωni (εi) , εi) = 0, a.s. (S.36)
Let Γ∗ni (ω) ∈ RT be the conditional expectation of Γni (ω, εi)
Γ∗ni (ω) = E [Γni (ω, εi)|X, pn] =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
E
[
ϕpin,ij (ω, εij)
∣∣X, pn] ,
where
E
[
ϕpin,ij (ω, εij)
∣∣X, pn] = Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZj − Λniω.
By Assumption 5(ii), Π∗ni (ω) is maximized at ω
∗
ni, so ω
∗
ni satisfies the first-order
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condition
Γ∗ni (ω
∗
ni) = 0. (S.37)
By a Taylor expansion of Γ∗ni (ω) at ω
∗
ni and the consistency of ωni (εi) in Lemma
S.5, we have
Γ∗ni (ωni (εi)) = ∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) (ωni (εi)− ω∗ni) +Op
(‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2) , (S.38)
where ∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) is the Jacobian matrix of Γ∗ni (ω) at ω∗ni defined in (S.34) that we
rewrite as
∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) = Hni (ω∗ni) Λni
with
Hni (ω
∗
ni) =
2
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZjZ
′
jΦni − IT .
By Assumption 5(iii), Hni (ω
∗
ni) is nonsingular. There exists a constant c > 0 such
that
‖∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) (ω − ω∗ni)‖ ≥ c ‖ω − ω∗ni‖
for every ω. This is because
‖∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) (ω − ω∗ni)‖2 = (ω − ω∗ni)′ (∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni))′∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) (ω − ω∗ni)
= (ω − ω∗ni)′ΛniHni (ω∗ni)′Hni (ω∗ni) Λni (ω − ω∗ni)
≥ λmin
(
Hni (ω
∗
ni)
′Hni (ω∗ni)
)
(ω − ω∗ni)′ Λ2ni (ω − ω∗ni)
≥ λmin
(
Hni (ω
∗
ni)
′Hni (ω∗ni)
)
λmin (V
′
niVni) ‖ω − ω∗ni‖2 ,
where λmin
(
Hni (ω
∗
ni)
′Hni (ω∗ni)
)
is the smallest eigenvalue ofHni (ω
∗
ni)
′Hni (ω∗ni), which
is positive because Hni (ω
∗
ni) is nonsingular, and λmin (V
′
niVni) is the smallest among
the eigenvalues of V ′niVni that are not zero, which is also positive. Combining this
with the Taylor expansion of Γ∗ni (ωni (εi)), we obtain
‖Γ∗ni (ωni (εi))‖ ≥ ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖ (c+ op (1)) . (S.39)
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By (S.36) and (S.37), we can write Γ∗ni (ωni (εi)) as
Γ∗ni (ωni (εi))
=− Γni (ω∗ni, εi)− (Γni (ωni (εi) , εi)− Γ∗ni (ωni (εi))− (Γni (ω∗ni, εi)− Γ∗ni (ω∗ni))) , a.s.
(S.40)
We apply the Lindeberg-Feller CLT to show that the first term on the right-hand side
satisfies
Γni (ω
∗
ni, εi) = Op
(
1√
n
)
. (S.41)
To verify the Lindeberg condition, define the mean 0 random vector
Y γn,ij =
1√
n− 11
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj − Λniω∗ni,
so that
Γni (ω
∗
ni, εi) =
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Y γn,ij.
By the Cramer-Wold device it suffices to show that a′
∑
j 6=i Y
γ
n,ij satisfies the Lindeberg
condition for any T × 1 vector of constants a. The Lindeberg condition is that for
any ξ > 0
lim
n→∞
1
a′Σγnia
∑
j 6=i
E
[(
a′Y γn,ij
)2
1
{∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣ ≥ ξ√a′Σγnia
}∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
= 0,
with
Σγni =
∑
j 6=i
V ar
(
Y γn,ij
∣∣X, pn)
=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni
)
·
(
1− Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni
))
ΛniΦ
′
niZjZ
′
jΦniΛni.
23
We have
∑
j 6=i
E
[(
a′Y γn,ij
)2
1
{∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣ ≥ ξ√a′Σγnia
}∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ E
[∑
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2
1
{
maxj 6=i
∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣√
a′Σγnia
≥ ξ
}∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
Note that
∑
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2
has a finite expectation and is therefore Op (1). Hence if
maxj 6=i
∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣√
a′Σγnia
= op (1) , (S.42)
then ∑
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2
1
{
maxj 6=i
∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣√
a′Σγnia
≥ ξ
}
= Op (1) op (1) = op (1) .
Finally, this random variable is bounded by
∑
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2
that has a finite expecta-
tion. We conclude that by dominated convergence the Lindeberg condition is satisfied
if (S.42) holds.
By Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr
(
maxj 6=i
∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣√
a′Σγnia
≥ ξ
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤ 1
ξ2a′Σγnia
E
[
max
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
The random variable a′Y γn,ij has a support bounded by
∣∣a′Y γn,ij∣∣ ≤ ‖a‖ ‖Λni‖
(√
T + ‖ω∗ni‖
)
√
n− 1 ≤
Mi√
n− 1
with Mi < ∞. Let ‖Z‖ψ|X,pn be the conditional Orlicz norm of a random variable
Z given X and pn for the convex function ψ (z) = e
z − 1.18 Then E [ |Z||X, pn] ≤
18The conditional Orlicz norm is defined by ‖Z‖ψ|X,pn = inf
{
C > 0 : E
(
ψ
(
|Z|
C
)∣∣∣X, pn) ≤ 1}.
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‖Z‖ψ|X,pn19 so that
E
[
max
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤
∥∥∥∥maxj 6=i (a′Y γn,ij)2
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
.
By the maximal inequality in Lemma 2.2.2 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) we
have the bound∥∥∥∥maxj 6=i (a′Y γn,ij)2
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤ K ln (n+ 1)max
j 6=i
∥∥∥(a′Y γn,ij)2∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
.
By the Hoeffding’s inequality for bounded random variables (Boucheron, Lugosi, and Massart,
2013, Theorem 2.8)
Pr
((
a′Y γn,ij
)2 ≥ t∣∣∣X, pn) = Pr(a′Y γn,ij ≥ √t∣∣∣X, pn)+ Pr(−a′Y γn,ij ≥ √t∣∣∣X, pn)
≤ 2 exp
(
−(n− 1) t
2M2i
)
so that by Lemma 2.2.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996)
∥∥∥(a′Y γn,ij)2∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤ 6M
2
i
n− 1 .
Combining these results
1
ξ2a′Σγnia
E
[
max
j 6=i
(
a′Y γn,ij
)2∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ 1
ξ2a′Σγnia
6K ln (n + 1)M2i
n− 1 = o (1)
so the Lindeberg condition holds.
As for the second term on the right-hand side of (S.40), note that
Γni (ω, εi)− Γ∗ni (ω) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)− E
[
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)
∣∣X, pn])
19This is true because z ≤ ψ (z), we have E
(
ψ
(
|Z|
‖Z‖ψ
)∣∣∣Xn, pn) ≤ 1 ≤
E
(
ψ
(
|Z|
E( |Z||Xn,pn)
)∣∣∣Xn, pn).
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with ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) defined by
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj. (S.43)
Define the empirical process
Gnϕ
γ
ni (ω, εi) =
√
n− 1 (Γni (ω, εi)− Γ∗ni (ω))
=
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)− E
[
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)
∣∣X, pn]) , ω ∈ Ω (S.44)
so the second term on the right-hand side of (S.40) can be written as
Γni (ωni (εi) , εi)− Γ∗ni (ωni (εi))− (Γni (ω∗ni, εi)− Γ∗ni (ω∗ni))
=
1√
n− 1 (Gnϕ
γ
ni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)) . (S.45)
In Lemma S.9(i) we show that
Gnϕ
γ
ni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi) = op (1) . (S.46)
Hence, the second term on the right-hand side of (S.40) is op
(
n−1/2
)
Γni (ωni (εi) , εi)− Γ∗ni (ωni (εi))− (Γni (ω∗ni, εi)− Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)) = op
(
1√
n
)
. (S.47)
Applying (S.39), (S.41) and (S.47) to (S.40) we obtain
‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖ (c+ op (1)) ≤ Op
(
1√
n
)
+ op
(
1√
n
)
. (S.48)
This implies that
ωni (εi)− ω∗ni = Op
(
1√
n
)
, (S.49)
i.e., ωni (εi) converges to ω
∗
ni at the rate of n
− 1
2 .
Combining (S.38), (S.40), and (S.47) yields
∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) (ωni (εi)− ω∗ni) = −Γni (ω∗ni, εi) + op
(
1√
n
)
.
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By Assumption 5(iii), ∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni) (ω − ω∗ni) = Λ+niΛni (ω − ω∗ni) = ω −
ω∗ni. Multiplying both sides by ∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+ we obtain
ωni (εi)− ω∗ni = −∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+ Γni (ω∗ni, εi) + rωni (εi)
= − 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+ ϕpin,ij (ω∗ni, εij) + rωni (εi) (S.50)
with rωni (εi) = op
(
1√
n
)
. The proof is complete.
Lemma S.8 (Uniform Properties of ωni (εi)) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and
5 are satisfied. Then (i) ωni (εi) satisfies
max
1≤i≤n
‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2 = op
(
1√
n
)
.
(ii) The remainder rωni (εi) defined in Lemma S.7 satisfies
max
1≤i≤n
‖rωni (εi)‖ = op
(
1√
n
)
.
Proof. Part (i): By Markov’s inequality, for any δ > 0,
Pr
(
max
1≤i≤n
√
n ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2 > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤
√
n
δ
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
Let ‖·‖ψ|X,pn be the conditional Orlicz norm given X and pn for the convex function
ψ (z) = ez − 1. By E [ |Z||X, pn] ≤ ‖Z‖ψ|X,pn for any random variable Z and the
maximal inequality in Lemma 2.2.2 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) we derive
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤
∥∥∥∥max1≤i≤n ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤ K ln (n+ 1) max
1≤i≤n
∥∥‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2∥∥ψ|X,pn ,
where K is a constant. Let ‖·‖ψ2|X,pn be the conditional Orlicz norm given X and pn
for the convex function ψ2 (z) = e
z2−1. For any random variable Z and constant C >
0, we have E
[
ψ
(
|Z|2
C2
)∣∣∣X, pn] = E [ψ2 ( |Z|C )∣∣∣X, pn], so ‖Z2‖ψ|X,pn = ‖Z‖2ψ2|X,pn.
Hence,
max
1≤i≤n
∥∥‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2∥∥ψ|X,pn = max1≤i≤n ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2ψ2|X,pn .
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From (S.38), (S.40), (S.45), and (S.50) in Lemma S.7, the remainder rωni (εi) is
rωni (εi) =∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+
·
(
Op
(‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2)+ 1√
n− 1 (Gnϕ
γ
ni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi))
)
.
(S.51)
Therefore, from (S.50) and (S.51), we obtain
ωni (εi)− ω∗ni
=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) +∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+
·
(
op (‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖) +
1√
n− 1 (Gnϕ
γ
ni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi))
)
.
By the triangle inequality for the Orlicz norm20 and the boundedness of the inverse
Jacobian ∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+ we obtain
‖(ωni (εi)− ω∗ni) (1 + op (1))‖ψ2|X,pn
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∥∥∥∥∥
ψ2|X,pn
+
1√
n− 1
∥∥∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+∥∥ ‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ψ2|X,pn . (S.52)
Note that ‖(ωni (εi)− ω∗ni) (1 + op (1))‖ψ2|X,pn = ‖(ωni (εi)− ω∗ni)‖ψ2|X,pn (1 + o (1)).21
Consider the first term on the right-hand side. Recall that the influence function
20Take two random variables X and Y . For any ε > 0, there exist u and v such that u <
‖X‖ψ2|X,pn + ε, v < ‖Y ‖ψ2|X,pn + ε, and max
{
E
[
|X|
u
∣∣∣X, pn] ,E [ |Y |v ∣∣∣X, pn]} ≤ 1. Because ψ2 is
non-decreasing and convex, we have
ψ2
( |X + Y |
u+ v
)
≤ ψ2
( |X |+ |Y |
u+ v
)
= ψ2
(
u
u+ v
|X |
u
+
v
u+ v
|Y |
v
)
≤ u
u+ v
ψ2
( |X |
u
)
+
v
u+ v
ψ2
( |Y |
v
)
.
Hence u and v satisfy u + v < ‖X‖ψ2|X,pn + ‖Y ‖ψ2|X,pn + 2ε and E
[
ψ2
(
|X+Y |
u+v
)∣∣∣X, pn] ≤ 1. By
definition of the Orlicz norm ‖X + Y ‖ψ2|X,pn ≤ u+ v < ‖X‖ψ2|X,pn + ‖Y ‖ψ2|X,pn +2ε. This proves
‖X + Y ‖ψ2|X,pn ≤ ‖X‖ψ2|X,pn + ‖Y ‖ψ2|X,pn .
21For any bounded random variable Z, we have ‖Zop (1)‖ψ2|X,pn = o
(
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
)
. This is
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ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) is a T × 1 vector given by
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
=−∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+
(
1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
∗
ni − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj − Λniω∗ni
)
.
Let ϕωn,ij,t (ω
∗
ni, εij) denote the t-th component of ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij), t = 1, . . . T . Note that
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∥∥∥∥∥ =
√√√√ T∑
t=1
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij,t (ω
∗
ni, εij)
)2
≤
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij,t (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
so for any x > 0,
Pr
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∥∥∥∥∥ > x
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤Pr
(
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij,t (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∣∣∣∣∣ > x
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤
T∑
t=1
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij,t (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∣∣∣∣∣ > xT
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
.
because for any sequence δn ↓ 0
1 < E
[
ψ2
(
|Zop (1)|
‖Zop (1)‖ψ2|X,pn − δn
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
= E
[
ψ2
(
|Zop (1)|
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
·
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
‖Zop (1)‖ψ2|X,pn − δn
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
If there wereM <∞ such that ‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn‖Zop(1)‖ψ2|X,pn−δn ≤M for n sufficiently large, since
|Zop(1)|
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
p→ 0,
we have for sufficiently large n
E
[
ψ2
(
|Zop (1)|
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
·
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
‖Zop (1)‖ψ2|X,pn − δn
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ E
[
ψ2
(
|Zop (1)|
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
·M
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
→ 0
by dominated convergence. Therefore,
‖Zop(1)‖ψ2|X,pn
−δn
‖Z‖
ψ2|X,pn
= o (1), so ‖Zop (1)‖ψ2|X,pn =
o
(
‖Z‖ψ2|X,pn
)
.
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It is clear that for any t = 1, . . . T , and i, j = 1, . . . , n,
∣∣ϕωn,ij,t (ω∗ni, εij)∣∣ < ∥∥ϕωn,ij (ω∗ni, εij)∥∥
≤ ∥∥∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+∥∥ (‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖+ ‖Λni‖ ‖ω∗ni‖) ≤ Mn,ij ≤M <∞.
By Hoeffding’s inequality for bounded random variables (Boucheron, Lugosi, and Massart,
2013, Theorem 2.8) we have
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij,t (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∣∣∣∣∣ > xT
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−(n− 1)x
2
2M2T 2
)
,
so
Pr
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∥∥∥∥∥ > x
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤ 2T exp
(
−(n− 1)x
2
2M2T 2
)
.
Hence, by Lemma 2.2.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996),
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
∥∥∥∥∥
ψ2|X,pn
≤
√
2 (2T + 1)TM√
n− 1 .
From (S.64) in the proof of Lemma S.9 we see that
‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ψ|X,pn = o (1) .
Following the proof for (S.64) and applying Theorems 2.14.5 and 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996) for p = 2 we can derive similarly
‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ψ2|X,pn = o (1) ,
so the second term on the right-hand side of (S.52) is o(1)√
n−1 .
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Combining the results yields
Pr
(
max
1≤i≤n
√
n ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2 > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤K
δ
√
n ln (n+ 1)
(√
2 (2T + 1)TM√
n− 1 +
o (1)√
n− 1
)2
=o (1) .
We conclude that max1≤i≤n ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2 = op
(
n−1/2
)
.
Part (ii): From (S.38), (S.40), (S.45), and (S.50) in Lemma S.7, the remainder
rωni (εi) is given by
rωni (εi) =∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+
·
(
Op
(‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2)+ 1√
n− 1 (Gnϕ
γ
ni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi))
)
.
It is clear that max1≤i≤n
∥∥∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+∥∥ ≤M <∞. By Lemma S.9(ii)
max
1≤i≤n
‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ = op (1) ,
so combining this with part (i) we obtain
max
1≤i≤n
‖rωni (εi)‖
≤ max
1≤i≤n
∥∥∇ω′Γ∗ni (ω∗ni)+∥∥
(
Op
(
max
1≤i≤n
‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2
)
+
1√
n− 1 max1≤i≤n ‖Gnϕ
γ
ni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖
)
=op
(
1√
n
)
.
The proof is complete.
Lemma S.9 (Stochastic equicontinuity) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 5 are
satisfied. Then Gnϕ
γ
ni (ω, εi) defined in (S.44) satisfies for any δ > 0,
(i) if ωni (εi)− ω∗ni = op (1),
Pr (‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ > δ|X, pn)→ 0 (S.53)
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as n→∞, and
(ii) if ωni (εi)− ω∗ni = Op
(
n−1/2
)
,
Pr
(
max
1≤i≤n
‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
→ 0 (S.54)
as n→∞.
Proof. Part (i): By consistency of ωni (εi), we can define hni by ωni (εi)−ω∗ni = r−1n hni
for some rni → ∞ at a rate slower than the rate at which ωni converges to ω∗ni so
that hni ∈ Ω if n is sufficiently large, because by Assumption 5 Ω contains a compact
neighborhood of 0.
By Markov’s inequality
Pr (‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ > δ|X, pn)
≤Pr
(
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
rni
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥ > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤1
δ
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
rni
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
We consider the empirical process
Gnϕ
γ
ni
(
ω +
h
rni
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
indexed by ω, h ∈ Ω. Recall that
Gnϕ
γ
ni (ω, εi)−Gnϕγni (ω˜, εi)
=
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)− ϕγn,ij (ω˜, εij)−
(
E
[
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)− ϕγn,ij (ω˜, εij)
∣∣X, pn]) ,
where ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) is defined in (S.43) by
ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
ΛniΦ
′
niZj .
Here we essentially need to show that this empirical process is stochastically equicon-
tinuous. Notice that this empirical process is a triangular array with function ϕγn,ij
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that varies across j (because we condition on X),22 so most of the ready-to-use re-
sults for stochastic equicontinuity (e.g. Andrews, 1994) are not applicable. Instead,
we apply maximal inequalities in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) to directly prove
the stochastic equicontinuity.
Observe that for any ω, ω˜ ∈ Ω the function ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) − ϕγn,ij (ω˜, εij) can be
bounded by
∥∥ϕγn,ij (ω, εij)− ϕγn,ij (ω˜, εij)∥∥
≤‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖
·
∣∣∣∣1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω ≥ εij
}
− 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω˜ ≥ εij
}∣∣∣∣
≤ηn,ij (ω, ω˜, εij) ,
with ηn,ij (ω, ω˜, εij) given by
ηn,ij (ω, ω˜, εij)
=


‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖ , if εij lies between Un,ij + 2(n−1)n−2 Z ′jΦniΛniω
and Un,ij +
2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω˜,
0, otherwise.
(S.55)
Next, we apply Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996). This theorem
gives a uniform upper bound to the absolute p-th moment of an empirical process
that we take as
Gn
(
ϕγni
(
ω +
h
rni
, εi
)
− ϕγni (ω, εi)
)
(S.56)
indexed by ω, h ∈ Ω. We take the expectation conditional on X and pn and set p = 1.
22Both Un,ij and Zj vary in j.
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The bound from Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) is23
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gn
(
ϕγni
(
ω +
h
rni
, εi
)
− ϕγni (ω, εi)
)∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ KE
[
J (1,Fni (εi)) sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥ηni
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εi
)∥∥∥∥
n
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
, (S.57)
where K > 0 is a constant and
∥∥∥∥ηni
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εi
)∥∥∥∥
2
n
=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)
. (S.58)
We first show that the uniform entropy integral J (1,Fni (εi)) in (S.57) is finite,
where Fni (εi) denotes the set of arrays
Fni (εi) =
{(
ϕγn,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, εij
)
− ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) , j 6= i
)
: ω, h ∈ Ω
}
, (S.59)
and J (1,Fni (εi)) is the uniform entropy integral of Fni (εi)
J (1,Fni (εi)) =
∫ 1
0
sup
α∈Rn−1
+
√
lnD (ξ ‖α⊙ η¯ni (εi)‖n , α⊙ Fni (εi) , ‖·‖n)dξ. (S.60)
In (S.60), η¯ni (εi) = supω,h∈Ω ηni
(
ω + h
rni
, ω, εi
)
is an (n− 1) × 1 vector of envelope
functions of Fni (εi), α is an (n− 1)× 1 vector of nonnegative constants, α⊙ η¯ni (εi)
is the Hadamard product of α and η¯ni (εi), and α ⊙ Fni (εi) is the set of Hadamard
products of α and the functions in Fni (εi). Also ‖·‖n is the empirical L2 norm defined
in (S.58), and D (ξ ‖α⊙ η¯ni (εi)‖n , α⊙Fni (εi) , ‖·‖n) is the packing number, i.e., the
maxinum number of points in the set α⊙Fni (εi) that are separated by the distance
ξ ‖α⊙ η¯ni (εi)‖n for the norm ‖·‖n. The sup in (S.60) is taken over all (n− 1) × 1
vectors α of nonnegative constants.
23From the proof of Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) it follows that the em-
pirical L2 norm of an envelope of Fni (εi) can be replaced by the sup of the empirical L2 norm of
the n − 1 bounding functions in ηni
(
ω + h
rni
, ω, εi
)
. Also the theorem holds for a triangular array
with independent but non-identically distributed observations.
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Consider the function
gn,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
.
It is an indicator with the argument being a linear function of ω. We can show that the
set {(gn,ij (ω, εij) , j 6= i) : ω ∈ Ω} has a pseudo-dimension of at most T ,24 so it is Eu-
clidean (Pollard, 1990, Corollary 4.10). Note that ϕγn,ij (ω, εij) = gn,ij (ω, εij) ΛniΦ
′
niZj,
and ΛniΦ
′
niZj is a T × 1 vector that does not depend on ω. From the stability re-
sults in Pollard (1990, Section 5), each component of the doubly indexed process
{(ϕγni
(
ω + h
rni
, εi
)
− ϕγni (ω, εi)), j 6= i) : ω, h ∈ Ω} is Euclidean. Therefore, the set
Fni (εi) has a finite uniform entropy integral, i.e.,
J (1,Fni (εi)) ≤ J¯ (S.61)
uniformly in εi and n for some J¯ <∞.
24To see this, by the definition of pseudo-dimension, it suffices to show that for each index set
I = {j1, . . . , jT+1} ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i} and each point c ∈ RT+1, there is a subset J ⊆ I such that no
ω ∈ Ω can satisfy the inequalities
1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}{
> cj for j ∈ J
< cj for j ∈ I\J
If c has a component cj that lies outside of (0, 1), we can choose J such that j ∈ J if cj ≥ 1 and
j ∈ I\J if cj ≤ 0 so no ω can satisfy the inequalities above. It thus suffices to consider c with all
the components in (0, 1) and for such c the inequalities reduce to
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
{ ≥ 0 for j ∈ J
< 0 for j ∈ I\J
Since Z ′jΦniΛni ∈ RT for all j, there exists a non-zero vector τ = (τ1, . . . , τT+1) ∈ RT+1 such
that
∑T+1
t=1 τtZ
′
jt
ΦniΛni = 0, so
∑T+1
t=1 τt
2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jt
ΦniΛniω = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. We may assume
that τt > 0 for at least one t. If
∑T+1
t=1 τt (Un,ijt − εn,ijt) ≥ 0, it is impossible to find a ω ∈ Ω
satisfying these inequalities for the choice J = {jt ∈ I : τt ≤ 0}, because this would lead to the
contradiction
∑T+1
t=1 τt (Un,ijt − εn,ijt) =
∑T+1
t=1 τt (Un,ijt − εn,ijt) +
∑T+1
t=1 τt
2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jt
ΦniΛniω =∑T+1
t=1 τt
(
Un,ijt +
2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jt
ΦniΛniω − εn,ijt
)
< 0. If
∑T+1
t=1 τt (Un,ijt − εn,ijt) < 0, we could choose
J = {jt ∈ I : τt ≥ 0} to reach a similar contradiction.
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Next we consider the empirical L2 norm in the bound. By Jensen’s inequality
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥ηni
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εi
)∥∥∥∥
n
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
=E


(
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
))1/2∣∣∣∣∣∣X, pn


≤
(
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
])1/2
. (S.62)
To derive an upper bound on the last term in (S.62), we consider the empirical
process
Gnη
2
ni
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εi
)
=
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)
− E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
])
indexed by ω, h ∈ Ω. Note that each η2n,ij is bounded by ‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖2 ≤ maxt=1,··· ,T λ2ni,tT
≤ η¯2 <∞. Similarly to (S.57), we apply Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996) to this empirical process with p = 1 and get an upper bound
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∣∣∣∣Gnη2ni
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εi
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ KηE [J (1,Fηni (εi))∥∥η¯2∥∥n∣∣X, pn] ,
with Kη > 0 a constant,
∥∥η¯2∥∥
n
=
√
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η¯4 = η¯2,
and J (1,Fηni (εi)) the uniform entropy integral of the set
Fηni (εi) =
{(
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)
, j 6= i
)
: ω, h ∈ Ω
}
.
Similarly to the argument for the set Fni (εi) in (S.59), we can show that the set
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Fηni (εi) has a finite uniform entropy integral
J (1,Fηni (εi)) ≤ J¯η <∞.
Therefore,
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)
− sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ 1√
n− 1E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∣∣∣∣Gnη2ni
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εi
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤K
ηJ¯ηη¯2√
n− 1 ≡
Mη√
n− 1 .
For any ω, h ∈ Ω and any j 6= i, by the mean-value theorem, we have
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
=
∣∣∣∣Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛni
(
ω +
h
rni
))
− Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)∣∣∣∣
· ‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖2
=fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛni
(
ω + tn,ij
h
rni
))
2 (n− 1)
n− 2
∣∣∣∣Z ′jΦniΛni hrni
∣∣∣∣ ‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖2
≤ 1
rni
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛni
(
ω + tn,ij
h
rni
))
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 ‖ΛniΦ
′
niZj‖3 sup
h∈Ω
‖h‖
(S.63)
for some tn,ij ∈ [0, 1]. By Assumption 1, the density fε is bounded. There is also a
finite bound on the eigenvalues in Λni that does not depend on i. We conclude that
there is a finite M with
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ M
rni
37
for all ω, h ∈ Ω and all j. Hence
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
rni
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ M
η
√
n− 1 +
M
rni
.
Combining the results we obtain the upper bound
Pr (‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ > δ|X, pn) ≤
KJ¯
δ
√
Mη√
n− 1 +
M
rni
,
which for all δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small by making n sufficiently large. Part
(i) is proved.
Part (ii): Because ωni (εi)−ω∗ni = Op
(
n−1/2
)
, we can define hni by ωni (εi)−ω∗ni =
n−κhni for 0 < κ < 1/2, and hni ∈ Ω if n is sufficiently large. By Markov’s inequality
Pr
(
max
1≤i≤n
‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤Pr
(
max
1≤i≤n
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥ > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤1
δ
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
Because for any random variable E [ |Z||X, pn] ≤ ‖Z‖ψ|X,pn with ‖·‖ψ|X,pn the condi-
tional Orlicz norm given X and pn and ψ (x) = e
x − 1, by the maximal inequality in
Lemma 2.2.2 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996)
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤
∥∥∥∥max1≤i≤n supω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤K ln (n+ 1) max
1≤i≤n
∥∥∥∥ sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
,
where K > 0 is a constant.
By Theorem 2.14.5 (with p = 1) and Lemma 2.2.2 in van der Vaart and Wellner
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(1996), we have
∥∥∥∥ sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤K1
(
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
+
lnn√
n− 1 maxj 6=i
∥∥∥∥ sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥ηn,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
)
.
In Part (i) we derived for the first term in the upper bound
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ KJ¯
√
Mη√
n− 1 +
M
nκ
.
For the second term by the definition of ηn,ij,
max
j 6=i
∥∥∥∥ sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥ηn,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤ max
j 6=i
‖ΛniΦ′niZj‖
≤ max
t=1,,T
λni,t
√
T ≤ η¯ <∞.
Therefore, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
∥∥∥∥ sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥Gnϕγni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
−Gnϕγni (ω, εi)
∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤K1
(
KJ¯
√
Mη√
n− 1 +
M
nκ
+
η¯ lnn√
n− 1
)
. (S.64)
Combining the results yields the upper bound
Pr
(
max
1≤i≤n
‖Gnϕγni (ωni (εi) , εi)−Gnϕγni (ω∗ni, εi)‖ > δ
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤KK1 ln (n+ 1)
δ
(
KJ¯
√
Mη√
n− 1 +
M
nκ
+
η¯ lnn√
n− 1
)
,
which for all δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small by making n sufficiently large. The
proof is complete.
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Asymptotic Distribution of θˆn
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The GMM estimator of θ0 satisfies the sample uncondi-
tional moment condition
Ψˆn(θˆn, pˆn) =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ij
(
Gn,ij − Pn,ij(θˆn, pˆn)
)
= op
(
1
n
)
with pˆn the T ×T matrix of empirical link frequencies between the types. We arrange
the link frequencies in a vector and with abuse of notation we use pˆn for vec(pˆ
′
n).
By a Taylor-series expansion of Pn,ij(θˆn, pˆn) around (θ0, pn)
Pn,ij(θˆn, pˆn) =Pn,ij(θ0, pn) +∇θ′Pn,ij(θ0, pn)(θˆn − θ0)
+∇p′Pn,ij(θ0, pn)(pˆn − pn) + op
(∥∥∥(θˆn, pˆn)− (θ0, pn)∥∥∥)
and upon rearranging the terms of the expansion we have
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ij∇θ′Pn,ij(θ0, pn)(θˆn − θ0)
=
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij(θ0, pn))
− 1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ij∇p′Pn,ij(θ0, pn)(pˆn − pn)
− 1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wˆn,ijop
(∥∥∥(θˆn, pˆn)− (θ0, pn)∥∥∥)+ op
(
1
n
)
,
where we assume that n is sufficiently large, so that (θˆn, pˆn) is in a neighborhood of
(θ0, pn) where Pn,ij(θ, p) is continuously differentiable.
The instruments Wˆn,ij are estimated, but we have maxi,j=1,...,n
∥∥∥Wˆn,ij −Wn,ij∥∥∥ =
op (1) by Assumption 4(iii), so the sampling variation in the instruments has no effect
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on the asymptotic distribution of θˆn. The GMM estimator thus satisfies
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇θ′Pn,ij (θ0, pn)
(
θˆn − θ0
)
=
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij(θ0, pn))
− 1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇p′Pn,ij (θ0, pn) (pˆn − pn)
+ op
(∥∥∥θˆn − θ0∥∥∥)+ op (‖pˆn − pn‖) + op
(
1
n
)
. (S.65)
where we have used
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ijop
(∥∥∥(θˆn, pˆn)− (θ0, pn)∥∥∥) ≤ op (∥∥∥θˆn − θ0∥∥∥)+ op (‖pˆn − pn‖)
because
∥∥∥(θˆn, pˆn)− (θ0, pn)∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥θˆn − θ0∥∥∥ + ‖pˆn − pn‖ and maxi,j=1,...,n ‖Wn,ij‖ < ∞
(Assumption 4(iii)).
Let us examine the first two terms on the right-hand side of (S.65), with the
first being the main term while the second gives the contribution of the first-stage
estimation of the link probabilities. Recall that pˆn is the vector of empirical fractions
of pairs of type s, t that have a link and pn is the vector of link probabilities of pairs
of type s, t so
pˆn − pn = 1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Qn,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij(θ0, pn)) ,
where Qn,ij = (Qn,ij,11, . . . , Qn,ij,1T , . . . , Qn,ij,T1, . . . , Qn,ij,TT )
′ ∈ RT 2 with
Qn,ij,st =
1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
1
n(n−1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i 1 {Xi = xs, Xj = xt}
, s, t = 1, . . . , T.
Hence, the first two terms on the right-hand side of (S.65) can be combined as
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
W˜n,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ0, pn)) ,
where W˜n,ij is the augmented instrument that combines the instruments for the first-
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stage and second-stage estimation
W˜n,ij = Wn,ij −
(
1
n (n− 1)
∑
k
∑
l 6=k
Wn,kl∇p′Pn,kl (θ0, pn)
)
Qn,ij.
Applying Lemma S.10 twice for the instrument vectors W˜n,ij and Qn,ij we get
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
W˜n,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ0, pn)) = Op
(
1
n
)
, (S.66)
and
pˆn − pn = Op
(
1
n
)
.
so (S.65) becomes
Jθn (θ0, pn)
(
θˆn − θ0
)
= Op
(
1
n
)
+ op
(∥∥∥θˆn − θ0∥∥∥)+ op
(
1
n
)
,
with Jθn (θ0, pn) being the Jacobian matrix
Jθn (θ0, pn) =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇θ′Pn,ij (θ0, pn) .
By Assumption 6(ii) Jθn (θ0, pn) is nonsingular, so
∥∥Jθn (θ0, pn) (θ − θ0)∥∥ ≥ c ‖θ − θ0‖
with c = λmin
(
Jθn (θ0, pn)
′ Jθn (θ0, pn)
)
> 0. Therefore,
∥∥∥θˆn − θ0∥∥∥ (c+ op (1)) ≤ Op
(
1
n
)
+ op
(
1
n
)
.
This implies that
θˆn − θ0 = Op
(
1
n
)
.
i.e., θˆn is n-consistent for θ0.
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To derive the asymptotic distribution of θˆn, we rewrite (S.65) as
√
n (n− 1)
(
θˆn − θ0
)
=
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Jθn (θ0, pn)
−1 W˜n,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ0, pn)) + op (1) .
Note that for each i the Gn,ij are correlated over j, so that a CLT for independent
random variables cannot be used. We need the result for dependent random variables
in Lemma S.10. The link chocies of i in the n− 1 vector Gni are correlated through
their dependence on ωni (εi). The correlation goes to 0 as n → ∞, so the sample
moments have an asymptotic normal distribution with a finite variance that accounts
for the variation in ωni (εi).
We apply Lemma S.10 for the instrument vector Jθn (θ0, pn)
−1 W˜n,ij. Define the
dθ × dθ matrix
Σn (θ0, pn) =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Σn,ij (θ0, pn)
with
Σn,ij (θ0, pn)
=Jθn (θ0, pn)
−1
E
[(
W˜n,ij
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
+ J˜ωni (ω
∗
ni)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
)
·
(
W˜n,ij
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
+ J˜ωni (ω
∗
ni)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
)′∣∣∣∣X, pn
] (
Jθn (θ0, pn)
−1)′
(S.67)
where ω∗ni ∈ RT maximizes Π∗ni (ω) in (4.8). The indicator function gn,ij (ω, εij) and
the corresponding probability P ∗n,ij (ω) are defined in Lemma S.10. The dθ×T matrix
J˜ωni (ω) is defined by
J˜ωni (ω) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
W˜n,ij∇ω′P ∗n,ij (ω)
The function ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) ∈ RT is the j-th term of the influence function of ωni
defined in (S.32) in Lemma S.7. By Lemma S.10,
√
n (n− 1)Σ−1/2n (θ0, pn)
(
θˆn − θ0
)
d→ N (0, Idθ)
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as n→∞. The proof is complete.
Lemma S.10 (Asymptotic normality of the sample moment) Suppose that As-
sumption 1-3 and 5 are satisfied. Define
Yn =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (Gn,ij − Pn,ij (θ0, pn)) .
where Wn,ij is a dθ × 1 instrument vector.25 Let Σn be the dθ × dθ positive-definite
matrix
Σn =
1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Σn,ij (S.68)
with
Σn,ij =E
[(
Wn,ij
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
+ Jωni (ω
∗
ni)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
)
· (Wn,ij (gn,ij (ω∗ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni))+ Jωni (ω∗ni)ϕωn,ij (ω∗ni, εij))′∣∣∣X, pn]
(S.69)
where ω∗ni ∈ RT maximizes the function
Π∗ni (ω) =
∑
j 6=i
E
[[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω.
The indicator functions gn,ij (ω, εij), the corresponding probabilities P
∗
n,ij (ω), and the
dθ × T matrix Jωni (ω) are defined by
gn,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
P ∗n,ij (ω) = Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
Jωni (ω) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇ω′P ∗n,ij (ω) ,
and ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) ∈ RT is the j-th term of the influence function of ωni (εi) defined
25Wn,ij is a generic valid instrument vector. It can be the augmented instrument vector W˜n,ij or
the vector of first-stage instruments Qn,ij . We discuss the choice of instrument in Section 4.
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in (S.32) in Lemma S.7. Then
Σ−1/2n Yn
d→ N (0, Idθ)
as n→∞, where Iθ is the dθ × dθ identity matrix.
Proof. Define the link choice indicator at ω ∈ Ω
gn,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
, j 6= i.
By Theorem 3.2, the observed link choice Gn,ij is given by gn,ij (ω, εij) evaluated at
ωni (εi), i.e.,
Gn,ij = gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij) , j 6= i, (S.70)
where ωni (εi) maximizes the function
Πni (ω) =
∑
j 6=i
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω, i = 1, . . . , n.
The conditional choice probability Pn,ij (θ0, pn) is thus the conditional expectation of
gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij)
Pn,ij = E [gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij)|X, pn] , j 6= i. (S.71)
The challenge in deriving the asymptotic distribution of the normalized sample
moment Yn lies in the fact that the link choices of an individual i, i.e., Gn,ij and
Gn,ik, are correlated through ωni (εi). As shown in Lemma S.5 ωni (εi) converges in
probability to ω∗ni that does not depend on εi. Let Π
∗
ni (ω) be the expectation of
Πni (ω)
Π∗ni (ω) =
∑
j 6=i
E
[[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij
]
+
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λniω,
i = 1, . . . , n. By Assumption 5 Π∗ni (ω) has a unique maximizer ω
∗
ni that does not
depend on εi.
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Define the function P ∗n,ij (ω)
P ∗n,ij (ω) = E [gn,ij (ω, εij)|X, pn]
= Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
, j 6= i. (S.72)
Here we treat ω as a parameter and take the expectation with respect to εij only.
The normalized sample moment Yn is equal to
Yn =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij)− E [gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij)|X, pn])
=T1n + T2n + T3n + T4n, (S.73)
where
T1n =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
T2n =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij (gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij)− gn,ij (ω∗ni, εij)
− (P ∗n,ij (ωni (εi))− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)))
T3n =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
(
P ∗n,ij (ωni (εi))− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
T4n =− 1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
(
E [gn,ij (ωni (εi) , εij)|X, pn]− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
. (S.74)
The terms in the decomposition have an interpretation. T1n is the sample mo-
ment condition if we replace ωni (εi) by its limit ω
∗
ni. This substitution removes the
correlation between the link choices of an individual. The term T2n contains the dif-
ference between the dependent (through ωni (εi)) sample moment function and the
independent one in T1n. The fact that this term is shown to be negligible shows that
the correlation between the link choices vanishes if n is large. The sampling variation
in ωni (εi) is captured by T3n which contributes to the asymptotic variance of the
moment function. Finally, the linear approximation of T3n has non-negligible approx-
imation errors (from both a Taylor series expansion remainder and a remainder in
the asymptotically linear approximation of ωni (εi)) that are op (1) if we add T4n.
Let us now examine the four terms in (S.74).
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Step 1: T1n.
The term T1n is a normalized sum of link indicators that are evaluated at ω
∗
ni
rather than ωni (εi) and thus are independent. This is the main term in Yn with
an asymptotically normal distribution, because the CLT applies. It captures the
sampling in the link choices, due to sampling variation in εij.
Step 2: T2n.
We show that T2n in (S.74) is op (1). Define for each i the empirical process
GnWnigni (ω, εi) =
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
(
gn,ij (ω, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω)
)
, ω ∈ Ω,
so that
T2n =
1√
n
∑
i
GnWni (gni (ωni (εi) , εi)− gni (ω∗ni, εi)) .
Since each GnWni (gni (ωni (εi) , εi)− gni (ω∗ni, εi)) only involves εi, conditional on X
and pn, they are independent. By Lemma S.7 ωni (εi) − ω∗ni = Op
(
n−1/2
)
, so if we
define hni by ωni (εi)− ω∗ni = n−κhni for 0 < κ < 1/2, then hni ∈ Ω if n is sufficiently
large, because by Assumption 5(i) Ω contains a compact neighborhood of 0. Note that
T2n is a normalized average of terms that are each op (1) by establishing stochastic
equicontinuity. Hence we cannot directly invoke a stochastic equicontinuity argument
to show that their sum T2n is op (1).
By Chebyshev’s inequality, for any δ > 0
Pr
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1√n
∑
i
GnWni (gni (ωni (εi) , εi)− gni (ω∗ni, εi))
∥∥∥∥∥ > δ
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤ 1
δ2n
∑
i
E
[‖GnWni (gni (ωni (εi) , εi)− gni (ω∗ni, εi))‖2∣∣X, pn]
≤ 1
δ2n
∑
i
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥GnWni
(
gni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
− gni (ω, εi)
)∥∥∥∥
2
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
(S.75)
Observe that for any ω, ω˜ ∈ Ω, the function Wn,ij (gn,ij (ω, εij)− gn,ij (ω˜, εij)) can
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be bounded by
‖Wn,ij (gn,ij (ω, εij)− gn,ij (ω˜, εij))‖
≤‖Wn,ij‖
∣∣∣∣1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
−1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω˜ − εij ≥ 0
}∣∣∣∣
≤ηn,ij (ω, ω˜, εij) ,
with ηn,ij (ω, ω˜, εij) given by
ηn,ij (ω, ω˜, εij)
=


‖Wn,ij‖ , if εij lies between Un,ij + 2(n−1)n−2 Z ′jΦniΛniω
and Un,ij +
2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω˜,
0, otherwise.
(S.76)
Next, we apply Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) (with p = 2).
This theorem gives a uniform upper bound to the absolute p-th moment of an empir-
ical process that we take as
GnWni
(
gni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
− gni (ω, εi)
)
(S.77)
indexed by ω, h ∈ Ω. The bound from Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996) is26
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥GnWni
(
gni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
− gni (ω, εi)
)∥∥∥∥
2
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤KE
[
J (1,Fni (εi))2 sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥ηni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εi
)∥∥∥∥
2
n
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
,
26Similarly to the proof in Lemma S.9, from the proof of Theorem 2.14.1 in
van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) it follows that the empirical L2 norm of an envelope of Fni (εi) can
be replaced by the sup of the empirical L2 norm of the n−1 bounding functions in ηni
(
ω + h
nκ
, ω, εi
)
.
Also the theorem holds for a triangular array with independent but non-identically distributed ob-
servations.
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where K > 0 is a constant and
∥∥∥∥ηni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εi
)∥∥∥∥
2
n
=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)
.
We now show that the uniform entropy integral J (1,Fni (εi)) (defined as in S.60)
is finite, where Fni (εi) denotes the set of functions
Fni (εi) =
{(
Wn,ij
(
gn,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εij
)
− gn,ij (ω, εij)
)
, j 6= i
)
: ω, h ∈ Ω
}
.
Consider
gn,ij (ω, εij) = 1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω − εij ≥ 0
}
.
It is an indicator with the argument being a linear function of ω. Following the
argument in Lemma S.9, we can show that the set {(gn,ij (ω, εij) , j 6= i) : ω ∈ Ω} has
a pseudo-dimension of at most T , so it is Euclidean (Pollard, 1990, Corollary 4.10).
Note that Wn,ij is a dθ × 1 vector that does not depend on ω. From the stability
results in Pollard (1990, Section 5), each component of the doubly indexed process
{(Wn,ij(gn,ij (ω + n−κh, εij)−gn,ij (ω, εij)), j 6= i) : ω, h ∈ Ω} is Euclidean. Therefore,
the set Fni (εi) has a finite uniform entropy integral bounded by some J¯ <∞.
Observe that
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥ηni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εi
)∥∥∥∥
2
n
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
=E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
Note that η2n,ij is bounded by ‖Wn,ij‖2 ≤ maxi,j=1,...,n ‖Wn,ij‖2 ≡ W¯ 2 <∞ (Assump-
tion 4(iii)). Similar to the argument in Lemma S.9 we can show that the set of
functions {(
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)
, j 6= i
)
: ω, h ∈ Ω
}
has a finite uniform entropy integral bounded by some J¯η <∞. Hence, we can apply
Theorem 2.14.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) and derive an upper bound on
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the expectation of the empirical process
Gnη
2
ni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εi
)
=
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)
− E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
])
indexed by ω, h ∈ Ω. The bound is
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∣∣∣∣Gnη2ni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ KηJ¯ηW¯ 2.
Therefore,
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)
− sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ 1√
n− 1E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∣∣∣∣Gnη2ni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤K
ηJ¯ηW¯ 2√
n− 1 ≡
Mη√
n− 1 . (S.78)
For any ω, h ∈ Ω and any j 6= i, by the mean-value theorem, we have
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
=
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛni
(
ω +
h
nκ
))
− Fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)∣∣∣∣
· ‖Wn,ij‖2
=fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛni
(
ω + tn,ij
h
nκ
))
2 (n− 1)
n− 2
∣∣∣∣Z ′jΦniΛni hnκ
∣∣∣∣ ‖Wn,ij‖2
≤ 1
nκ
fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛni
(
ω + tn,ij
h
nκ
))
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 ‖ΛniΦ
′
niZj‖ ‖Wn,ij‖2 sup
h∈Ω
‖h‖
for some tn,ij ∈ [0, 1]. By Assumption 1, the density fε is bounded. There is also
a finite bound on the eigenvalues in Λni and on the instruments Wn,ij that does not
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depend on i and j. We conclude that there is a finite M with
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ M
nκ
for all ω, h ∈ Ω and all i, j so that
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
E
[
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ M
nκ
.
By (S.78)
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
η2n,ij
(
ω +
h
nκ
, ω, εij
)∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ M
η
√
n− 1 +
M
nκ
.
Combining the results we obtain the upper bound
E
[
sup
ω,h∈Ω
∥∥∥∥GnWni
(
gni
(
ω +
h
nκ
, εi
)
− gni (ω, εi)
)∥∥∥∥
2
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ KJ¯
(
Mη√
n− 1 +
M
nκ
)
.
(S.79)
Hence the upper bound in (S.75) is
KJ¯
δ2
(
Mη√
n− 1 +
M
nκ
)
which for all δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small by making n sufficiently large. We
conclude that T2n = op (1).
Step 3: T3n.
We use the delta method to derive an asymptotically linear representation of T3n,
from which we can see how T3n contributes to the asymptotic distribution of Yn.
By (S.72) the probability P ∗n,ij (ω) is differentiable in ω with the derivative
∇ωP ∗n,ij (ω) =
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 fε
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦniΛniω
)
ΛniΦ
′
niZj ,
By a Taylor series expansion of P ∗n,ij (ωni (εi)) around ω
∗
ni, T3n can be written as
T3n =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
(∇ω′P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni) (ωni (εi)− ω∗ni) +Op (‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2))
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By Lemma S.7, for any i, ωni (εi)− ω∗ni = Op
(
n−1/2
)
and ωni (εi) has the asymptoti-
cally linear approximation
ωni (εi)− ω∗ni =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) + r
ω
ni,
with the influence function ϕωn,ij defined in Lemma S.7. The remainder r
ω
ni satisfies
max1≤i≤n ‖rωni‖ = op
(
n−1/2
)
(Lemma S.8(ii)). Denote by Jωni (ω
∗
ni) the dθ×T Jacobian
matrix
Jωni (ω
∗
ni) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇ω′P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni) , i = 1, . . . , n.
and by W¯ni the average instrument vector
W¯ni =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij, i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that both Jωni (ω
∗
ni) and W¯ni are bounded uniformly over i. Replacing ωni (εi)−ω∗ni
with its asymptotically linear approximation we derive
T3n =
1√
n
∑
i
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij∇ω′P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)(
1√
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ϕωn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) +
√
n− 1rωni
)
+
1√
n
∑
i
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
)
Op
(√
n− 1 ‖ωni − ω∗ni‖2
)
=T l3n + r1n + r2n, (S.80)
where
T l3n =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Jωni (ω
∗
ni)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij) ,
and
r1n =
√
n− 1
n
∑
i
Jωni (ω
∗
ni) r
ω
ni,
r2n =
√
n− 1
n
∑
i
W¯niOp
(‖ωni − ω∗ni‖2) .
The term T l3n in (S.80) contributes to the asymptotic distribution and has an
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asymptotically normal distribution. It captures the random variation in ωni (εi). We
will combine it with T1n to derive the asymptotic distribution of Yn.
The two remainder terms r1n and r2n are not asymptotically negligible. The sum
of these terms and the fourth term T4n in (S.74) is however op (1).
Step 4: T4n.
Observe that E [Yn|X, pn] = 0, so
0 = E [T1n + T2n + T3n + T4n|X, pn]
= E
[
T1n + T2n + T
l
3n + r1n + r2n + T4n
∣∣X, pn]
It is clear that E [T1n|X, pn] = E
[
T l3n
∣∣X, pn] = 0. We have shown in Step 2 that
E [T 22n|X, pn] = o (1), so E [T2n|X, pn] = o (1). This implies that
E [r1n + r2n + T4n|X, pn] = E [r1n|X, pn] + E [r2n|X, pn] + T4n = o (1) .
Hence,
r1n + r2n + T4n = r1n + r2n − E [r1n|X, pn]− E [r2n|X, pn] + o (1) .
Note that
E [r1n|X, pn] =
√
n− 1
n
∑
i
Jωni (ω
∗
ni)E [r
ω
ni|X, pn] ,
E [r2n|X, pn] =
√
n− 1
n
∑
i
W¯niE
[
Op
(‖ωni − ω∗ni‖2)∣∣X, pn] .
Below we show that the two centered remainders r1n − E [r1n|X, pn] and r2n −
E [r2n|X, pn] are both op (1).
We show r1n−E [r1n|X, pn] = op (1) and the proof for r2n−E [r2n|X, pn] is similar.
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By Chebyshev’s inequality, for any δ > 0,
Pr (‖r1n − E [r1n|X, pn]‖ > δ|X, pn)
≤ 1
δ2
E
(‖r1n − E [r1n|X, pn]‖2∣∣X, pn)
=
n− 1
nδ2
∑
i
E
(
(rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])′ Jωni (ω∗ni)′ Jωni (ω∗ni) (rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])
∣∣X, pn)
≤n− 1
δ2
max
i
E
(
(rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])′ Jωni (ω∗ni)′ Jωni (ω∗ni) (rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])
∣∣X, pn) ,
where the equality follows because conditional on X and pn, r
ω
ni depends on εi
only and therefore they are independent over i by Assumption 1. From Lemma
S.8(ii), max1≤i≤n ‖rωni‖ = op
(
n−1/2
)
, by the dominated convergence theorem we have
E [max1≤i≤n ‖rωni‖|X, pn] = o
(
n−1/2
)
, so max1≤i≤n ‖rωni − E [rωni|X, pn]‖ ≤ max1≤i≤n ‖rωni‖
+E [max1≤i≤n ‖rωni‖|X, pn] = op
(
n−1/2
)
. This together with the boundedness of
Jni (ω
∗
ni) implies that the term (r
ω
ni − E [rωni|X, pn])′ Jni (ω∗ni)′ Jni (ω∗ni) (rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])
is op (n
−1) uniformly over i. By the dominated convergence theorem again, we obtain
E
(
max
1≤i≤n
(rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])′ Jni (ω∗ni)′ Jni (ω∗ni) (rωni − E [rωni|X, pn])
∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
= o
(
1
n
)
,
This shows that
r1n − E [r1n|X, pn] = op (1) .
Similarly, with Op
(‖ωni − ω∗ni‖2) in place of rωni and W¯ni in place of Jni (ω∗ni), and
by max1≤i≤n ‖ωni (εi)− ω∗ni‖2 = op
(
n−1/2
)
(Lemma S.8(i)), we can derive that
r2n − E [r2n|X, pn] = op (1) .
Combining the results yields
r1n + r2n + T4n = r1n + r2n − E [r1n|X, pn]− E [r2n|X, pn] + o (1) = op (1) .
Now we return to the two main terms T1n in (S.74) and T
l
3n in (S.80). Both are
normalized averages of independent random variables. If we define the dθ×1 random
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vector
Y lni =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
Wn,ij
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
+ Jωni (ω
∗
ni)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
then
T1n + T
l
3n =
∑
i
Y lni.
Note that conditional on X and pn, Y
l
ni, i = 1, . . . , n, is an independent triangular
array becuase each Y lni depends on εi only, and εi, i = 1, . . . , n, are i.i.d. by Assump-
tion 1. Conditional on X and pn the Y
l
ni are not identically distributed so we have to
use the Lindeberg-Feller central limit theorem (CLT) for triangular arrays to derive
the asymptotic distribution of
∑
i Y
l
ni.
Conditional on X and pn, Y
l
ni has mean 0. By independence of Y
l
ni, the variance
of
∑
i Y
l
ni is given by
∑
i
V ar
(
Y lni
∣∣X, pn) =∑
i
E
[
Y lni
(
Y lni
)′∣∣∣X, pn] = 1
n (n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Σn,ij = Σn
where Σn,ij is defined in (S.69).
Since Y lni is a vector, we verify that the conditions in the Lindeberg-Feller CLT
hold for a′
∑
i Y
l
ni for any vector of constants a ∈ Rdθ so that (a′Σna)−1/2 a′
∑
i Y
l
ni
converges in distribution to N (0, 1). By the Crame´r–Wold theorem, this implies that
Σ
−1/2
n
∑
i Y
l
ni converges in distribution to N (0, Idθ).
Observe that given X and pn, a
′∑
i Y
l
ni has mean 0 and variance a
′Σna. For the
Lindeberg condition, we need to show that for any ξ > 0,
lim
n→∞
1
a′Σna
∑
i
E
[(
a′Y lni
)2
1
{∣∣a′Y lni∣∣ ≥ ξ√a′Σna}∣∣∣X, pn] = 0. (S.81)
We have
∑
i
E
[(
a′Y lni
)2
1
{∣∣a′Y lni∣∣ ≥ ξ√a′Σna}∣∣∣X, pn]
≤E
[∑
i
(
a′Y lni
)2
1
{
max1≤i≤n
∣∣a′Y lni∣∣√
a′Σna
≥ ξ
}∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
,
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Note that
∑
i
(
a′Y lni
)2
has a finite expectation and is therefore Op (1). Hence if
max1≤i≤n
∣∣a′Y lni∣∣√
a′Σna
= op (1) (S.82)
then ∑
i
(
a′Y lni
)2
1
{
max1≤i≤n
∣∣a′Y lni∣∣√
a′Σna
≥ ξ
}
= Op (1) op (1) = op (1)
Finally, this random variable is bounded by
∑
i
(
a′Y lni
)2
that has a finite expectation.
We conclude that by dominated convergence the Lindeberg condition is satisfied if
(S.82) holds.
By Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr
(
max1≤i≤n
∣∣a′Y lni∣∣√
a′Σna
≥ ξ
∣∣∣∣∣X, pn
)
≤ 1
ξ2a′Σna
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
(
a′Y lni
)2∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
.
By the maximal inequality in Lemma 2.2.2 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996),
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
(
a′Y lni
)2∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ K ln (n+ 1) max
1≤i≤n
∥∥∥(a′Y lni)2∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
,
where K is a constant depending only on ψ and ‖Z‖ψ|X,pn is the conditional Orlicz
norm of a random variable Z given X and pn for the convex function ψ (z) = e
z − 1.
By convexity of ψ, E ( |Z||X, pn) ≤ ‖Z‖ψ|X,pn.
Next we derive a bound on max1≤i≤n
∥∥∥(a′Y lni)2∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
. Recall that
a′Y lni =
1√
n (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
a′
(
Wn,ij
(
gn,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni)
)
+ Jωni (ω
∗
ni)ϕ
ω
n,ij (ω
∗
ni, εij)
)
.
Each term in the average is bounded by
∣∣a′ (Wn,ij (gn,ij (ω∗ni, εij)− P ∗n,ij (ω∗ni))+ Jωni (ω∗ni)ϕωn,ij (ω∗ni, εij))∣∣
≤ ‖a‖ (2 ‖Wn,ij‖+ ‖Jωni (ω∗ni)‖∥∥ϕωn,ij (ω∗ni, εij)∥∥) ≡Mn,ij ≤Mn <∞,
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so each normalized term in the sum has a support that is contained in
[
− Mn,ij√
n (n− 1) ,
Mn,ij√
n (n− 1)
]
.
By Hoeffding’s inequality for bounded random variables (Boucheron, Lugosi, and Massart,
2013, Theorem 2.8), we have for any t > 0,
Pr
(∣∣a′Y lni∣∣ > t∣∣X, pn) ≤ 2 exp
(
− n (n− 1) t
2
2
∑
j 6=iM
2
n,ij
)
.
Therefore, by Lemma 2.2.1 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996),
∥∥∥(a′Y lni)2∥∥∥
ψ|X,pn
≤ 6
∑
j 6=iM
2
n,ij
n (n− 1) ,
Combining the results we obtain
E
[
max
1≤i≤n
(
a′Y lni
)2∣∣∣∣X, pn
]
≤ 6K ln (n + 1)
∑
j 6=iM
2
n,ij
n (n− 1) ≤
6KMn ln (n + 1)
n
→ 0,
so (S.82) holds and and the Lindeberg condition (S.81) is proved.
By the Lindeberg-Feller CLT
a′
∑
i Y
l
ni√
a′Σna
d→ N (0, 1) .
Because Σn is a symmetric and positive-definite matrix, there is a nonsingular sym-
metric matrix Σ
1/2
n such that Σ
1/2
n Σ
1/2
n = Σn. Let a˜ = Σ
1/2
n a, then a′
∑
i Yni =
a˜′Σ−1/2n
∑
i Y
l
ni and a
′Σna = a˜′Σ
−1/2
n ΣnΣ
−1/2
n a˜ = a˜′a˜. Note that Σn is nonsingular, so
a˜ is also an arbitrary vector in Rdθ . The previous result then implies that
a˜′Σ−1/2n
∑
i
Y lni
d→ N (0, a˜′a˜) .
By the Cramer-Wold device,
Σ−1/2n
∑
i
Y lni
d→ N (0, Idθ) .
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where Idθ is the dθ × dθ identity matrix.
Because
Yn =
∑
i
Y lni + op (1) ,
we conclude that by Slutsky’s theorem Yn has the asymptotic distribution
Σ−1/2n Yn
d→ N (0, Idθ) .
S.3 Proofs in Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We prove the theorem in the case where both Ti+ and Ti−
are nonempty. The proof also holds for special cases where Ti+ is empty (i.e., all the
eigenvalues of Vi (X, σ) are nonpositive) or Ti− is empty (i.e., all the eigenvalues of
Vi (X, σ) are nonnegative) without modification. Note that the latter special case has
been proved in Theorem 3.2.
From Proposition 3.1, the expected utility satisfies
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (Uij (X, σ)− εij)
+
∑
t
λit (X, σ)max
ωt∈R
{
2 (n− 1)
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
GijZ
′
jφit (X, σ)ωt −
(n− 1)2
n− 2 ω
2
t
}
= max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
j
∑
t
φit (X, σ) λit (X, σ)ωt − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2
∑
t
λit (X, σ)ω
2
t (S.83)
= max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λi (X, σ)ω. (S.84)
The second equality in (S.83) follows because if we move an eigenvalue λit inside a
maximization, it remains a maximzation if λit ≥ 0 and becomes a minimization if
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λit < 0. Note that the transformed expected utility is separable in each maximization,
so the order of the maximizations and minimizations in (S.83) and (S.84) does not
matter.
Denote by Π˜ (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ) the objective function of the maximin problem in
(S.84)
Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ) =
∑
j 6=i
Gij
(
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ω − εij
)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ω
′Λi (X, σ)ω.
We have
max
Gi
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
=max
Gi
max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ)
≤ max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
max
Gi
Π˜i (Gi, ω, εi, X, σ)
= max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ) , (S.85)
where Πi (ω, εi, X, σ) is defined in (5.2). The inequality follows because Π˜i (Gi, ω) ≤
maxGi Π˜i (Gi, ω) for all Gi and ω, so we have
max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Π˜i (Gi, ω) ≤ max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
max
Gi
Π˜i (Gi, ω)
for all Gi, and thus the maximum of the left-hand side over Gi is bounded above by
the right-hand side. The last equality in (S.85) holds because for any ω, Π˜i (Gi, ω) is
separable in each Gij so the optimal Gij is given by (5.1) with ωi (X, εi, σ) replaced
by ω and maxGi Π˜i (Gi, ω) = Πi (ω).
We now show that the inequality in (S.85) is an equality. Since ωi (X, εi, σ) is a
solution to the maximin problem in the last line of (S.85), similarly as in Lemma S.1
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it satisfies the first-order condition
Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ)
=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
{
Uij (X, σ) +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ)− εij ≥ 0
}
· Λi (X, σ) Φ′i (X, σ)Zj, a.s..
Pre-multiplication by Φi (X, σ) gives
Φi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ) =
1
n− 1Vi (X, σ)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj, a.s., (S.86)
where Gij (X, εi, σ) is given in (5.1). By the definition of Gi (X, εi, σ) and ωi (X, εi, σ),
the maximin value of Π (ω, εi, X, σ) is given by
max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ)
=Π˜ (Gi (X, εi, σ) , ωi (X, εi, σ) ;X, εi, σ)
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ) (Uij (X, σ)− εij)
+
2 (n− 1)
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Z
′
jΦi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ)
− (n− 1)
2
n− 2 ωi (X, εi, σ)
′ Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ) .
Let V +i (X, σ) and Λ
+
i (X, σ) be the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of Vi (X, σ)
and Λi (X, σ), respectively. Clearly V
+
i (X, σ) = Φi (X, σ) Λ
+
i (X, σ) Φi (X, σ)
′. The
quadratic term in the last display satisfies
ωi (X, εi, σ)
′ Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ)
=ωi (X, εi, σ)
′ Λi (X, σ) Λ+i (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ)
=ωi (X, εi, σ)
′ Λi (X, σ) Φi (X, σ)
′Φi (X, σ) Λ+i (X, σ) Φi (X, σ)
′Φi (X, σ) Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ)
=
1
(n− 1)2
(
Vi (X, σ)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj
)′
V +i (X, σ)
(
Vi (X, σ)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj
)
, a.s.,
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where we have used (S.86) to derive the last equality. Therefore,
max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ)
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ) (Uij (X, σ)− εij)
+
2
n− 2
(∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj
)′
Vi (X, σ)
(∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj
)
− 1
n− 2
(
Vi (X, σ)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj
)′
V +i (X, σ)
(
Vi (X, σ)
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Zj
)
=
∑
j 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ) (Uij (X, σ)− εij)
+
1
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
Gij (X, εi, σ)Gik (X, εi, σ)Z
′
jVi (X, σ)Zk, a.s.
=E [Ui(Gi (X, εi, σ) , G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ] , a.s.. (S.87)
Combining (S.85) and (S.87) yields
max
Gi
E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ]
≤ max
(ωt,t∈Ti+)
min
(ωt,t∈Ti−)
Πi (ω, εi, X, σ)
=E [Ui(Gi (X, εi, σ) , G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ] , a.s..
Because maxGi E [Ui(Gi, G−i, X, εi)|X, εi, σ] ≥ E[Ui(Gi(X, εi, σ), G−i, X, εi) |X, εi, σ ],
the inequality becomes an equality, and all the terms are equal. Hence, Gi (X, εi, σ)
is an optimal solution almost surely.
As for the uniqueness, Gi (X, εi, σ) is unique almost surely because εi has a contin-
uous distribution, so two link decisions achieve the same utility with probability zero.
The uniqueness of Λi (X, σ)ωi (X, εi, σ) follows from the uniqueness of Gi (X, εi, σ),
(S.86) and the invertibility of Φi (X, σ). The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. For simplicity, we omit the arguments (X, σ) (or (Xi, σ))
whenever possible. Define ω˜ni (εi) = Φniωni (εi) and ω˜i = Φiωi. The finite-n and
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limiting conditional choice probabilities depend on ω˜ni (εi) and ω˜i, respectively, i.e.,
Pn,ij (X, σ) = Pr
(
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi)− εij ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣X, σ
)
and
Pij (Xi, Xj , σ) = Pr
(
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜i − εij ≥ 0
∣∣Xi, Xj , σ) .
Notice that
ω′Λniω = (Φniω)
′ Vni (Φniω)
ω′Λiω = (Φiω)
′ Vi (Φiω) .
Since Φni and Φi are nonsingular, there are one-to-one mappings between ω and Φniω
and between ω and Φiω. Therefore, ω˜ni (εi) and ω˜i are the solutions to
max
ω˜
Π˜ni (ω˜, εi, X, σ) = max
ω˜
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ − εij
]
+
−n− 1
n− 2 ω˜
′Vniω˜
and
max
ω˜
Π˜i (ω˜, Xi, σ) = max
ω˜
E
[[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
∣∣∣Xi, σ]− ω˜′Viω˜,
respectively. The advantage of the change of variables is that we get rid of the eigen-
values and eigenvectors in the expressions so that the conditional choice probabilities
and the objective functions Π˜ni and Π˜i only involve Vni and Vi.
By the definition of Pn,ij and Pij ,
|Pn,ij (X, σ)− Pij (Xi, Xj, σ)|
≤E
[∣∣∣∣1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi) ≥ εij
}
− 1{Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜i ≥ εij}
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣X, σ
]
≤E
[∣∣∣∣1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi) ≥ εij
}
− 1{Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i ≥ εij}
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣X, σ
]
+ E
[∣∣1{Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i ≥ εij}− 1{Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜i ≥ εij}∣∣∣∣X, σ] . (S.88)
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Observe that
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi)−
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i
)
=2Z ′jVni (ω˜ni (εi)− ω˜i) +
2
n− 2Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi)
≡∆ni (εi)
so the first term in the last expression in (S.88) can be bounded by
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|X, σ)
+ Pr
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i − δn ≤ εij ≤ Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i + δn
∣∣X, σ) (S.89)
for δn > 0. This is because if εij lies between Un,ij +
2(n−1)
n−2 Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi) and Un,ij +
2Z ′jVniω˜i, and if their difference |∆ni (εi)| is at most δn, then εij must lie between
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i − δn and Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i + δn.
Given Xi and σ, ω˜ni (εi) − ω˜i = op (1) by Lemma S.11. Since Vni and ω˜ni (εi) =
Φniωni (εi) are bounded, we have for any δn > 0
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, σ)→ 0
as n→∞. By the law of iterated expectation
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, σ) = E [Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj, σ)|Xi, σ]
=
T∑
t=1
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj = xt, σ) Pr (Xj = xt) .
In the expression the expectation is taken with respect to Xj. If there is t ∈
{1, . . . , T} such that Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj = xt, σ) does not converge to 0, then
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, σ) cannot converge to 0. This implies that given Xi, Xj, and
σ we have
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj , σ)→ 0.
Note that X = (Xi, Xj, X−ij), where X−ij = (Xk, k 6= i, j). By the law of iterated
expectation again
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj , σ) = E [Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ)|Xi, Xj , σ] ,
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where the expectation is taken respect to X−ij. Because convergence in mean implies
convergence in probability (by Markov’s inequality), given Xi, Xj, and σ we must
have
Pr ( |∆ni (εi)| > δn|Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ) = op (1) . (S.90)
For the second term in the bound in (S.89), by the mean-value theorem
Pr
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i − δn ≤ εij ≤ Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i + δn
∣∣Xi, Xj , X−ij, σ)
=Fε
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i + δn
)− Fε (Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i − δn)
=2fε
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i + tn,ijδn
)
δn
for some tn,ij ∈ [−1, 1]. Since the density fε is bounded, fε
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i + tn,ijδn
)
is bounded as well. We choose δn > 0 with δn ↓ 0 as n→∞, so
Pr
(
Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i − δn ≤ εij ≤ Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i + δn
∣∣Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ) = op (1) .
(S.91)
Combining (S.90) and (S.91), given Xi, Xj , and σ the first term in the last expression
in (S.88) is op (1)
E
[
1
{
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ni (εi) ≥ εij
}
− 1{Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i ≥ εij}
∣∣∣∣Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ
]
= op (1) .
The last term in (S.88) satisfies
E
[∣∣1{Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i ≥ εij}− 1{Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜i ≥ εij}∣∣∣∣Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ]
=
∣∣Fε (Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i)− Fε (Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜i)∣∣
=2fε
(
t˜n,ij
) ∣∣Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i − (Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜i)∣∣
≤2fε
(
t˜n,ij
)
(|Un,ij − Uij |+ 2 ‖Vni − Vi‖ ‖ω˜i‖)
for some t˜n,ij between Un,ij + 2Z
′
jVniω˜i and Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜i, where the second equality
follows from the mean-value theorem. Since the density fε is bounded, and given Xi,
Xj, and σ, Un,ij − Uij = op (1) and Vni − Vi = op (1) by Assumption 7, the last term
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in (S.88) is also op (1)
E
[∣∣1{Un,ij + 2Z ′jVniω˜i ≥ εij}− 1{Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜i ≥ εij}∣∣∣∣Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ] = op (1) .
Combining the results we conclude that given Xi, Xj, and σ
Pn,ij (Xi, Xj, X−ij, σ)− Pij (Xi, Xj, σ) = op (1) .
The proof is complete.
Lemma S.11 (Consistency of ω˜ni (εi) for ω˜i) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and
7 are satisfied. Given Xi and σ, ω˜ni (εi) and ω˜i defined in the proof of Theorem 5.3
satisfy ω˜ni (εi)− ω˜i = op (1), i.e., for any δ > 0,
Pr (‖ω˜ni (εi)− ω˜i‖ > δ|Xi, σ)→ 0 (S.92)
as n→∞.
Proof. Recall that ω˜ni (εi) and ω˜i are solutions to the transformed maximization
problems
max
ω˜
Π˜ni (ω˜, εi, X, σ) = max
ω˜
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ − εij
]
+
−n− 1
n− 2 ω˜
′Vniω˜
and
max
ω˜
Π˜i (ω˜, Xi, σ) = max
ω˜
E
[[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
∣∣∣Xi, σ]− ω˜′Viω˜. (S.93)
Because the original maximization problem in (5.8) has a unique solution ωi by As-
sumption 7, the one-to-one relationship between ωi and ω˜i implies that ω˜i is the
unique solution to the transformed maximization problem.
Observe that
∂
∂c
E [c− ε]+ =
∂
∂c
∫ c
−∞
(c− ε) fε (ε) dε = Fε (c) .
The first-order condition of (S.93) is given by
∇ω˜Π˜i (ω˜, Xi, σ) = 2ViE
[
ZjFε
(
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜
)∣∣Xi, σ]− 2Viω˜ = 0. (S.94)
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It is easy to see that any ω˜ that satisfies the first-order condition must be bounded.
Without loss of generality we can assume that ω˜i is in a compact set Ω˜. Since
Π˜i (ω˜, Xi, σ) is continuous in ω˜, if we can further establish a uniform LLN for the
objective functions, i.e.,
sup
ω˜
∣∣∣Π˜ni (ω˜, εi, X, σ)− Π˜i (ω˜, Xi, σ)∣∣∣ = op(1) (S.95)
as n → ∞, following a standard consistency proof (Newey and McFadden, 1994) we
can prove (S.92).
By the triangle inequality
sup
ω˜
∣∣∣Π˜ni (ω˜, εi, X, σ)− Π˜i (ω˜, Xi, σ)∣∣∣
≤ sup
ω˜
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣
[
Un,ij +
2 (n− 1)
n− 2 Z
′
jVniω˜ − εij
]
+
− [Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜ − εij]+
∣∣∣∣
+ sup
ω˜
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
− E
[[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
∣∣∣Xi, σ]
∣∣∣∣∣
+ sup
ω˜
∣∣∣∣n− 1n− 2 ω˜′Vniω˜ − ω˜′Viω˜
∣∣∣∣ . (S.96)
Because
∣∣[x]+ − [y]+∣∣ ≤ |x− y|, the first term on the right-hand side can be bounded
by
sup
ω˜
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣(Un,ij − Uij) + 2Z ′j (Vni − Vi) ω˜ + 2n− 2Z ′jVniω˜
∣∣∣∣
≤max
j 6=i
|Un,ij − Uij |+ 2 ‖Vni − Vi‖ sup
ω˜
‖ω˜‖+ 2
n− 2 ‖Vni‖ supω˜ ‖ω˜‖
=op (1) ,
where the last equality follows because maxj 6=i |Un,ij − Uij | = op (1) and Vni − Vi =
op (1) by Assumption 7, and ‖Vni‖ and supω˜ ‖ω˜‖ are bounded. Similarly, we can
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bound the last term on the right-hand side of (S.96) by
sup
ω˜
|ω˜′ (Vni − Vi) ω˜|+ sup
ω˜
1
n− 2 |ω˜
′Vniω˜|
≤
(
‖Vni − Vi‖+ 1
n− 2 ‖Vni‖
)
sup
ω˜
‖ω˜‖2
=op (1) .
For the second term on the right-hand side of (S.96), observe that given Xi and
σ, the functions
[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
are i.i.d. across j. These functions have an
envelope
[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
≤
[
Uij + 2 ‖Vi‖ sup
ω˜
‖ω˜‖ − εij
]
+
, ∀ω˜ ∈ Ω˜,
that is integrable since
E
[[
Uij + 2 ‖Vi‖ sup
ω˜
‖ω˜‖ − εij
]
+
∣∣∣∣Xi, σ
]
≤E
[∣∣∣∣Uij + 2 ‖Vi‖ sup
ω˜
‖ω˜‖ − εij
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Xi, σ
]
≤
(
E
[(
Uij + 2 ‖Vi‖ sup
ω˜
‖ω˜‖ − εij
)2∣∣∣∣∣Xi, σ
])1/2
<∞.
Note that Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ is linear in ω and the function [x]+ is Lipschitz in x because∣∣[x]+ − [y]+∣∣ ≤ |x− y|. The function [Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜ − εij]+ is therefore Lipschitz in
ω˜, i.e., for any ω˜1, ω˜2 ∈ Ω˜
∣∣∣[Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜1 − εij]+ − [Uij + 2Z ′jViω˜2 − εij]+
∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ‖Vi‖ ∥∥ω˜1 − ω˜2∥∥ ,
so the class of functions
{[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
, ω˜ ∈ Ω˜
}
is a type II class as defined
in Andrews (1994). It thus satisfies Pollard’s entropy condition (Andrews, 1994,
Theorem 2), and the uniform LLN follows
sup
ω˜
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
− E
[[
Uij + 2Z
′
jViω˜ − εij
]
+
∣∣∣Xi, σ]
∣∣∣∣∣ = op (1) .
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Hence (S.95) is proved.
Proof of Example 5.1. We verify that under Assumption 7(i), Un,ij (X, σ) and
Vni (X, σ) given in Example 5.1 satisfy Assumption 7(ii). Recall that
Un,ij (X, σ)− Uij (Xi, Xj, σ)
=
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
σ (Xj , Xk) β5 (Xi, Xj, Xk)− E [σ (Xj, Xk)β5 (Xi, Xj , Xk)|Xi, Xj, σ]
− 1
n− 2Z
′
jVni (X, σ)Zj ,
and for s, t = 1, . . . , T ,
Vni,st (X, σ)− Vi,st (Xi, σ)
=
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
(σ (xs, Xl) σ (xt, Xl) γ2 (Xi, xs, xt)
−E [σ (xs, Xl) σ (xt, Xl) γ2 (Xi, xs, xt)|Xi, σ]) .
Denote
∆U (Xi, Xj , Xk, σ)
=σ (Xj, Xk)β5 (Xi, Xj, Xk)− E [σ (Xj , Xk) β5 (Xi, Xj, Xk)|Xi, Xj, σ] ,
and for s, t = 1, . . . , T ,
∆Vst (Xi, xs, xt, Xl, σ)
=σ (xs, Xl)σ (xt, Xl) γ2 (Xi, xs, xt)− E [σ (xs, Xl)σ (xt, Xl) γ2 (Xi, xs, xt)|Xi, σ] .
We first look at Un,ij (X, σ)− Uij (Xi, Xj , σ). Given Xi, Xj and σ, for any δ > 0,
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by Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, Xj, Xk, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
∣∣∣∣∣Xi, Xj , σ
)
≤ 1
δ2
E

( 1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, Xj, Xk, σ)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣Xi, Xj , σ


=
1
δ2 (n− 2)2
∑
k 6=i,j
E
[(
∆U (Xi, Xj , Xk, σ)
)2∣∣∣Xi, Xj, σ]→ 0
as n → ∞, where the equality follows because Xk, k 6= i, j, are i.i.d. (Assumption
7(i)). This proves
1
n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, Xj, Xk, σ) = op (1)
for any j 6= i. Because 1
n−2
∑
k 6=i,j∆
U (Xi, Xj, Xk, σ) depends on j only through Xj,
27
and Xj takes only T values, we have
max
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, Xj, Xk, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣ = maxt=1,...,T
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, xt, Xk, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, xt, Xk, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣ = op (1) .
The second term in Un,ij (X, σ)− Uij (Xi, Xj, σ) satisfies
max
j 6=i
1
n− 2
∣∣Z ′jVni (X, σ)Zj∣∣ ≤ 1n− 2 ‖Vni (X, σ)‖ = op (1) ,
because Vni (X, σ) is bounded. Therefore,
max
j 6=i
|Un,ij (X, σ)− Uij (Xi, Xj, σ)|
≤max
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 2
∑
k 6=i,j
∆U (Xi, Xj, Xk, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣+maxj 6=i 1n− 2
∣∣Z ′jVni (X, σ)Zj∣∣ = op (1) .
27Note that 1
n−2
∑
k 6=i,j ∆
U (Xi, Xj , Xk, σ) =
1
n−2
∑
k 6=i,j′ ∆
U (Xi, Xj′ , Xk, σ) for any j 6= j′ with
Xj = Xj′ .
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As for Vni (X, σ)− Vi (Xi, σ), by Chebyshev’s inequality and i.i.d. Xl
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
∆Vst (Xi, xs, xt, Xl, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
∣∣∣∣∣Xi, σ
)
≤ 1
δ2
E


(
1
n− 3
∑
l 6=i,j,k
∆Vst (Xi, xs, xt, Xl, σ)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣Xi, σ


=
1
δ2 (n− 3)2
∑
l 6=i,j,k
E
[(
∆Vst (Xi, xs, xt, Xl, σ)
)2∣∣∣Xi, σ]→ 0
as n→∞. Hence, for s, t = 1, . . . , T ,
Vni,st (X, σ)− Vi,st (Xi, σ) = op (1) .
We conclude that
‖Vni (X, σ)− Vi (Xi, σ)‖ ≤ max
s,t=1,...,T
|Vni,st (X, σ)− Vi,st (Xi, σ)| = op (1) .
The proof is complete.
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